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Abstract 
 
For the past decade the United States and its European allies powers have been unable to 
persuade the Islamic Republic of Iran to halt what appears to be a program to develop 
either a nuclear-weapons capability or an actual atomic arsenal.  There is good reason to 
want to prevent Iran from acquiring atomic weapons, although it is too late to stop Tehran 
from acquiring the capability to produce a nuclear weapon should it choose to 
manufacture one.  Tehran‘s desire to develop either a nuclear weapons capability or an 
actual arsenal is based on a realist assessment of its security environment – it is looking 
for a way of ensuring the survival and independence of the regime and warding off 
potential attacks by the United States or other countries.  There have been a number of 
missed opportunities to defuse the nuclear standoff with Iran.  The first was in May 2003 
when Iran sent the U.S. government via the Swiss a proposal for discussions on a ―grand 
bargain‖ to restore ties between Tehran and Washington.  The Bush administration did 
not even respond.  Britain, France and Germany might have been able to reach an 
agreement with Iran in 2003-2005, but Washington undermined the Europeans‘ ability to 
reach a deal with Tehran.  Negotiations between Iran and the five permanent U.N. 
Security Council members and Germany have also been unsuccessful in persuading 
Tehran to abandon its enrichment program.  Coercive diplomacy has not worked.  
Sanctions have not persuaded Iran to reach an agreement with the West, though they have 
crippled the Iranian economy and hurt ordinary Iranians.  There is no viable military 
option to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran.  The use of force against Iran‘s nuclear 
facilities would only make Tehran more determined to develop atomic weapons.  While 
there are Iranian officials who would like a deal, it is not clear that Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will ever be willing to reach an agreement with the West.  But 
there is still a remote chance of striking a deal with Tehran provided Western powers are 
willing to allow Iran a limited enrichment program and offer it the kind of security 
guarantees it wants.  Iran would have to allow limits on its enrichment program and 
intrusive IAEA inspections before sanctions could begin to be lifted.  Containment of a 
nuclear Iran is feasible and may be the only available option in the future. 
 3 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In this thesis I attempt to explain why for the past 10 years the United States and 
other Western powers have been unable to persuade the Islamic Republic of Iran to halt 
what appears to be a program to develop either a nuclear-weapons capability or an actual 
atomic arsenal.  There is good reason to want to prevent Iran from acquiring atomic 
weapons, although it is too late to prevent it acquiring the capability to produce a nuclear 
weapon should it choose to develop one.  I argue that a nuclear-armed Iran within striking 
range of Israel would not result in a ―stable‖ Cold War-style balance of power in the 
Middle East as neorealist Kenneth Waltz has suggested, but would likely have the 
opposite effect, dramatically increasing tensions in a highly unstable region.  
Nevertheless, it is a threat that could be contained by the United States if necessary.  Iran 
has good reason to want a nuclear deterrent, given the fact that it is surrounded by 
unfriendly Arab states, has been attacked with chemical weapons by neighboring Iraq, 
and has been repeatedly threatened with regime change by the United States.  Any 
resolution of the crisis with Iran would have to address Tehran‘s desire for security, in 
addition to the security needs of other countries in the region, including Israel. 
I also argue that military force can do little or nothing to prevent Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons if it is determined to get them.  In that sense, the military 
option is not a real option for dealing with the problem.  The only way to defuse the crisis 
is at the negotiating table – a possible but exceedingly difficult challenge.  Israel‘s Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly threatened Iran with possible military 
action, most dramatically during his speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September 
2012 when he displayed a cartoonish bomb diagram to illustrate how far Iran‘s nuclear 
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program has developed and where Israel‘s ―red line‖ lies.1  In February 2013 Netanyahu 
again warned Tehran that its expanding centrifuge program meant Iran could drastically 
reduce the time needed to develop an atomic weapon, suggesting that Israel might be 
faced with a decision on whether or not to attack Iran‘s nuclear installations sooner rather 
than later.
2
  U.S. President Barack Obama has refused to rule out military force, but has 
also cautioned Israel not to act rashly or prematurely and to allow time and space for 
diplomacy.
3
   
Could airstrikes be effective in halting or significantly slowing down the Iranian 
nuclear program?  A number of prominent military analysts and experts are skeptical 
when it comes to the question of bombing Iran‘s nuclear installations to halt its quest for 
a nuclear deterrent.  Former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike 
Mullen said at a 2010 Pentagon briefing that military force cannot destroy Iran‘s nuclear 
program.
4
  Iran‘s nuclear know-how and its motives for pursuing such a program would 
remain long after the fires were put out and the corpses buried after the bombing raids.  In 
fact, such strikes would only increase Iran‘s desire for nuclear empowerment by 
highlighting the threat it faces from a hostile world beyond its borders.  
My hypothesis is that a decade after Britain, France and Germany launched the 
West‘s so far unsuccessful attempt to convince Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment 
program, it is still possible for Iran and major Western powers to reach an agreement that 
would end the crisis – provided the cautious and conservative Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
                                                 
1
 Rick Gladstone and David E. Sanger, "Nod to Obama by Netanyahu in Warning to Iran on Bomb," The 
New York Times, September 27, 2012.  Last accessed March 4, 2013: http://nyti.ms/S48ftt 
2
 Ori Lewis, "New Iran centrifuges could shorten path to atomic bomb: Netanyahu," Reuters, February 11, 
2013. Last accessed March 2, 2013: http://reut.rs/YS9ifM  
3
 Mark Landler, "Obama Says Iran Strike Is an Option, but Warns Israel," The New York Times, March 2, 
2012, Last accessed March 4, 2013: http://nyti.ms/xeaLSt  
4
 "No strike, however effective, will be in and of itself decisive," Admiral Mike Mullen said. As quoted in 
Haaretz, "Military strike won't stop Iran's nuclear program," February 22, 2010. 
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Ali Khamenei agrees to it.  The use of the word ―crisis‖ here is appropriate, because the 
standoff over Iran‘s nuclear program has dramatically increased tensions in the Middle 
East, escalating recently into an exchange of threats of war between Iran and Israel.  The 
biggest challenge for negotiators is that any sustainable resolution of the crisis would 
require some kind of rapprochement between Tehran and Washington.  That is difficult to 
imagine at the moment given the intense suspicion and lack of trust on both sides, as well 
as the enormous political difficulties Iran‘s factious leadership would face in trying to 
find a consensus on reaching any agreement involving the United States.  So far, Iranian 
negotiators have never been able to muster the broad support they would need at home to 
reach a deal with the West, despite several attempts to do so, largely due to the 
internecine domestic politics inside Iran. 
The five permanent U.N. Security Council members – Britain, France, the United 
States, Russia and China – and Germany have also missed several key opportunities to 
persuade Tehran to halt its uranium enrichment program in seven years of negotiations 
between Iran and the so-called ―P5-plus-one‖5, despite repeated offers of economic and 
political incentives in exchange for a suspension of all sensitive nuclear activities.  The 
most recent rounds of negotiations between Iran and the P5-plus-one took place in 
February and April 2013 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.  As with previous rounds, there were no 
breakthroughs apart from an agreement to meet again.
6
  That prompted Israel‘s Prime 
Minister Benjamin to repeat his suspicion that Iran has been using negotiations to buy 
                                                 
5
 The group is also sometimes called the ―E3-plus-three‖, referring to the fact that it is the three European 
countries that launched negotiations with Iran in 2003 – Britain, France and Germany – plus the three 
countries that joined the trio later – the United States, Russia and China. 
6
 Justyna Pawlak and Fredrik Dahl, "Iran upbeat on nuclear talks, West still wary," Reuters, February 27, 
2013. Last accessed March 4, 2013: http://reut.rs/Wh2uv6  
 6 
time to develop a nuclear weapon.
7
  On its part, Iran has failed to persuade the 
international community that it is not attempting to amass the capability to produce a 
weapon under cover of a civilian nuclear energy program, largely due to evidence the 
U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has amassed of a military dimension 
to Iran‘s nuclear program.  I conclude with a set of 10 recommendations for securing a 
negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear standoff.  As difficult as it may be, there are 
examples of countries that have been brought back from the brink of becoming nuclear 
weapons states throughout history – Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, 
Sweden and Taiwan.  There is no reason to think that Iran could not join those other 
nations. 
 One of my basic assumptions is that Iran is working to develop the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons, though it remains unclear whether Iran‘s leadership has made a 
strategic decision to develop an actual atomic bomb.  Iranian authorities insist that they 
do not want atomic weapons but pepper their denials with threats that suggest they want 
major powers to know that if they wanted a nuclear arsenal, they could easily have one.
8
  
Despite its protestations that its nuclear ambitions are entirely peaceful, there is ample 
evidence that Tehran has in the past pursued – and may still be pursuing – an atomic 
weapons capability.  The IAEA has been pursuing a special investigation of Iran‘s 
nuclear program since early 2003.  It opened that investigation after the United States 
provided the agency with intelligence about the existence of two undeclared nuclear 
installations, a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water production plant 
                                                 
7
 Dan Williams, "Netanyahu says Iran using nuclear talks to 'buy time' for bomb," Reuters, March 3, 2013.  
Last accessed March 3, 2013: http://reut.rs/YLQWN7  
8
 Reuters, "Iran not seeking a nuclear weapon: Supreme Leader," February 16, 2013.  Last accessed 
February 16, 2013: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/16/iran-nuclear-idUSL6N0BG0TH20130216  
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at Arak.
9
  Contrary to popular belief, it was the U.S. intelligence community that 
discovered Natanz and Arak, not the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an 
Iranian dissident group linked to the People‘s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) that has claimed 
to have discovered both sites.
10
  But it is true that the existence of the Natanz and Arak 
facilities was first made public at an NCRI press conference in August 2002.  The NCRI 
announcement sparked much public discussion about a possible Iranian weapons nuclear 
program.   
The IAEA investigation quickly determined that Iran‘s principal nuclear 
technology supplier was Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani metallurgical engineer who had 
worked at the Anglo-Dutch-German uranium enrichment consortium URENCO in the 
Netherlands in the 1970s
11
 and is widely considered the father of Pakistan‘s nuclear 
weapons program.  In 1987, while the Iran-Iraq war was still raging, a group of Iranians 
met in Dubai with Swiss middlemen working on behalf what is now referred to as the 
Khan network, an illicit procurement web that enabled Iran, North Korea and Libya to 
acquire uranium enrichment and other potentially weapons-related nuclear technology.
12
  
At that meeting, Iran agreed to purchase prototype enrichment centrifuges from Khan‘s 
laboratories in Pakistan.
13
  The clandestine revival of an Iranian nuclear program that had 
been mothballed after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the timing and Iran‘s dealings with 
                                                 
9
 Mark Hibbs, ―U.S. Briefed Suppliers Group in October on Suspected Iranian Enrichment Plant,‖ Nuclear 
Fuel 27:26 (December 23, 2002): 1. 
10
 Jeffrey Lewis, ―NCRI Did Not Discover Natanz,‖ Arms Control Wonk (blog), October 28, 2006. 
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1274/ncri-did-not-discover-natanz  
11
 Khan was sentenced in absentia by a Dutch court for attempted espionage due to suspicions that he might 
have stolen sensitive uranium enrichment centrifuge designs with him to Pakistan, but that conviction was 
later overturned.  Khan has always denied such allegations. 
12
 David Sanger, ―The Khan Network,‖ Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, Stanford 
University, June 4-5, 2004. 
13
 For a comprehensive account of the Khan network and Iran‘s dealings with it, see Douglas Frantz and 
Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist (Twelve: New York, 2007). 
 8 
the Khan network are among the pieces of circumstantial evidence that point to a 
potential Iranian nuclear weapon project. 
Nearly decade after the agency began its investigation of the Iranian nuclear 
program, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said in his November 2011 report on 
Iran for the agency‘s Board of Governors that the Islamic Republic was not cooperating 
with his inspectors and suspicions that Tehran‘s atomic program has a military dimension 
were growing. 
Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the 
possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities 
involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the 
development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency 
has regularly received new information.
14
 
 
A year later the IAEA published a similar conclusion, saying its investigation had not 
made any significant progress in verifying Iran‘s claims of innocence. 
(A)s Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not 
implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide 
credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 
activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran 
is in peaceful activities.
15
 
 
The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 concluded that Iran has not made a final 
decision to develop the bomb and suspended secret studies into producing a nuclear 
weapon in 2003.  European and Israeli intelligence officials have disputed some of the 
details of this finding and believe Iran continued some of its atom bomb research well 
past 2003.
16
   
                                                 
14
 International Atomic Energy Agency, ―Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran for November 8, 2011‖ (GOV/2011/65).  
15
 International Atomic Energy Agency, ―Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran,‖ November 16, 2012 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2012/gov2012-
55.pdf.  Last accessed November 30, 2012  
16
 Louis Charbonneau, ―Iran would need 18 months for atom bomb-diplomats,‖ Reuters, October 26, 2009. 
Last accessed on April 3, 2013: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN25158068 
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(T)he U.S. intelligence community assessed that, in the fall of 2003, the 
Iranian government halted its clandestine research and development 
program for nuclear weapons – but not the nuclear fuel cycle systems, 
such as centrifuges, needed to produce the fissile material for a possible 
weapon. (British intelligence services surveying the same information 
concluded that though Iran halted weaponization activities in 2003, it 
subsequently resumed them.) In sum, the circumstantial evidence strongly 
suggests that Iran is, at a minimum, aiming to develop a nuclear weapons 
capability.
17
 
 
In February 2012, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. 
summed up the U.S. intelligence assessment of Iran‘s pursuit of a nuclear weapons 
capability in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: ―They are 
certainly moving on that path, but we don‘t believe they have actually made the decision 
to go ahead with a nuclear weapon.‖18  According to the IAEA‘s quarterly reports and a 
wide range of open-source information, often citing Western intelligence assessments, it 
is clear that Iran has so far not enriched uranium to levels needed for a weapon.  It has 
kept its enrichment to the point where its uranium is no more than about 20 percent 
uranium-235, the fissile uranium isotope, a purity level that is well below the more than 
90 percent uranium-235 needed for a weapon.  However, a group of nonproliferation 
experts recently predicted that if Iran made a decision to begin producing weapons-grade 
uranium, it would only need around four months to produce a sufficient quantity for a 
single bomb.
19
  While it would take some time to prepare any bomb-grade uranium and 
mount it onto a weapon – to weaponize it – if that assessment is correct, Iran‘s nuclear 
capability is quite advanced already. 
                                                 
17
 Ray Takeyh, ―Introduction: What Do We Know?‖ in (ed.) Robert D. Blackwill, Iran: The Nuclear 
Challenge, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2012), 2.  
18
 James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, "U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a Bomb," The New York 
Times, February 24, 2012.  Last accessed March 3, 2013: http://nyti.ms/PKetL8  
19
 David Albright et al., ―Preventing Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining its Future Nuclear 
Options,‖ Institute for Science and International Security, March 5, 2012. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/USIP_Template_5March2012-1.pdf  
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Some of the IAEA‘s concerns about Iran center on intelligence data the United 
States handed over to the IAEA several years ago, suggesting that Tehran has conducted 
research into designing and fabricating a nuclear weapon. Iran says that intelligence is 
based on forged documents but has yet to provide the IAEA with satisfactory information 
to explain away what the IAEA refers to as the ―alleged studies,‖20 which reportedly 
analyze how to adapt Iran‘s Shahab-3 missiles to accommodate a nuclear warhead.21  Due 
to its refusal to suspend its enrichment program as demanded by the U.N. Security 
Council in four sanctions resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010, the Islamic 
Republic has been hit with a broad array of international sanctions imposed by the U.N. 
Security Council, the United States and the European Union.  But Iran has pressed ahead 
with enrichment, insisting on its right to maintain the full nuclear fuel cycle in line with 
its rights under Article IV of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
22
  Throughout 
this thesis, I refer to Iran‘s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent or desire for nuclear 
empowerment.  By that I mean that Iran is either attempting to develop an arsenal of 
nuclear weapons or the capability to produce such weapons in a short period of time 
should it choose to do so.  In practical terms, there may be little difference between the 
two scenarios, though there is an important legal difference.  In terms of compliance with 
                                                 
20
 International Atomic Energy Agency, ―Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran for November 23, 2010‖, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-62.pdf (November 23, 2010): 8. 
21
 Institute for Science and International Security, ―Excerpts from Internal IAEA Document on Alleged 
Iranian Weaponization,‖ http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_info_3October2009.pdf 
(October 2, 2009). 
22
 Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. Article IV of the NPT 
includes the following: ―Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all 
the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.‖ 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml 
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the NPT, one can be on the threshold of a having nuclear weapons – a ―virtual‖ nuclear 
weapon state – while technically being in full compliance with the treaty.23 
The Security Council has imposed four rounds of increasingly draconian 
sanctions on Iran, most recently in the form of resolution 1929 adopted in June 2010.  
Whatever the uncertainties are regarding the details of the IAEA‘s findings and Western 
intelligence assessments of the progress Iran has made in its nuclear program, all of the 
Security Council‘s resolutions on Iran‘s nuclear program have made clear that it 
considers Iran‘s uranium enrichment program to be a potential threat to international 
peace and security. Its first sanctions resolution, adopted in December 2006, voiced 
serious concern about ―outstanding issues and concerns on Iran‘s nuclear program, 
including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is 
unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.‖24 
The council also expressed support for a negotiated solution to the crisis. The Security 
Council‘s repeated calls for a suspension of Iran‘s enrichment program are legally 
binding under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. 
  Another question I address in this thesis is why Iran would want a nuclear arsenal 
in the first place.  Viewed through the eyes of a realist, having a nuclear deterrent to 
counter what Iran sees as potential long-term security threats from the United States, 
Israel, Pakistan, Iraq and other countries would make sense.  There are other questions I 
attempt to answer:  (1) what are the opportunities the major powers and Iran have missed 
in resolving the crisis; (2) why have negotiations failed so far to produce an acceptable 
                                                 
23
 Former IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei has warned of the danger of having such ―virtual‖ nuclear 
weapon states.  See Julian Borger, ―Mohamed ElBaradei warns of new nuclear age,‖ The Guardian, May 
14, 2009 
24
 U.N. Security Council, ―Resolution 1737 (2006) [Nonproliferation],‖ (S/RES/1737). December 23, 2006.  
 12 
outcome; (3) can Iran be persuaded with a combination of sanctions and incentives to 
reach an agreement acceptable to the West and to Tehran on its nuclear program; (4) does 
the Islamic Republic want to resolve the standoff; (5) are sanctions an effective tool of 
persuasion; and finally (6) is there a viable military option for dealing with Iran‘s nuclear 
program if diplomacy and sanctions fail. 
In my thesis, I use a variety of sources of information to document Iran‘s nuclear 
program and the public and private diplomacy surrounding it for the past decade.  Those 
include academic literature and journal articles, official U.N. documents, credible news 
reports from newspapers and other media organizations, as well as dispatches from 
official Iranian state media.  I also draw on some of the information and observations I 
have gathered from U.N. and government officials and diplomats in my own work as a 
journalist covering Iran‘s nuclear program for over 10 years. 
 13 
Chapter 2 - Review of Literature: Why Would Iran Want the Bomb? 
The U.N. Security Council has declared that Iran‘s uranium enrichment program 
could pose a threat to international peace and security and should therefore be suspended 
until the international community receives assurances from the IAEA that Tehran‘s 
overall nuclear program is entirely peaceful.
25
  But is it possible that a nuclear-armed Iran 
could actually improve regional peace and security, not undermine it?  Some scholars 
have argued that an expansion of the club of nuclear-armed nations could have beneficial 
effects on international security by helping to establish a Cold War-style, stable balance 
of power.  In 1981, neo-realist political scientist Kenneth Waltz published a provocative 
monograph on the potential benefits of nuclear proliferation – The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: More May Be Better.
26
  In an updated version of his monograph, included in a 
1995 book he co-authored with Scott Sagan, Waltz argued that the U.S.-Soviet balance of 
nuclear power had created a degree of stability in Europe and ensured that the long 
border between Western and Eastern Europe remained free of skirmishes after World 
War Two.  He also included what would seem like a dire prediction to opponents of 
nuclear weapons: ―Someday the world will be populated by fifteen or eighteen nuclear-
weapon states.‖27  But Waltz does not suggest that such a world would be bad. On the 
contrary, he was optimistic that there would never be a deadly nuclear confrontation 
between members of the small group of states with atomic arsenals.  The reason for his 
optimism about the behavior of nuclear weapon states is his faith that they will remain 
                                                 
25
 Ibid 
26
 Kenneth Waltz, ―The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,‖ Adelphi Papers 171 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). 
27
 Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1995), 2.  In the 1981 version of his essay, Waltz predicted that someday there would be ―ten 
or twelve or eighteen nuclear weapon states.‖ 
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―rational‖ – that is, act in a way that ensures their own survival – and shrink in fear at the 
idea of the total devastation that nuclear weapons can wreak.  For Waltz, a structural 
realist who does not consider internal domestic questions, such as whether a country has 
a democratic or authoritarian system, to be relevant to his analysis, states are like rational 
beings who know that atomic weapons are the ultimate destructive device.  This raises 
the costs of war to the point where nuclear-armed foes must think carefully whether it 
would be suicidal to ignite a conflict that could result in, if not mutual annihilation, at 
least something close to it.
28
  For that reason, nuclear weapon states always choose to 
avoid confrontation and the result is peace.  
If Waltz is correct, why not let Iran have nuclear weapons since an Iranian arsenal 
could balance Israel‘s, thereby increasing stability in the Middle East?  Waltz himself 
made this argument last year in an essay entitled ―Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.‖  
Waltz argued that Israel was the principal motivating factor for Iran‘s nuclear ambitions 
and an Iranian nuclear arsenal could help stabilize the region, since it would represent a 
counterweight to the threat Israel‘s nuclear weapons pose for the Middle East. 
It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed 
most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is 
surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential 
balancer to emerge.
29
 
 
Scott Sagan, a critic of deterrence theory, rejects the idea that Cold War-style balance-of-
power and containment would work in the case of Iran.  A nuclear Iran, Sagan argues, 
would abandon caution and act more like Pakistan than ―nuclearized democracies‖ such 
as Israel or India.
30
  Optimistic scenarios about a nuclear Iran, Sagan writes, ignore the 
                                                 
28
 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 3. 
29
 Kenneth Waltz, ―Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,‖ Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2012). 
30
 Sagan, ―How to Keep the Bomb from Iran,‖ 53. 
 15 
possibility that Tehran would feel secured against a U.S. invasion or Israeli airstrikes and 
emboldened to attack tankers in the Persian Gulf, as it has done in the past, or help 
Hezbollah strike at Israel or U.S. troops in the region.  It could also threaten its Arab 
neighbors.  More worrying is the possibility that Iranian authorities would be unable to 
control the activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an elite military 
force that has been assigned the task of securing Iran‘s nuclear facilities and is known to 
have links to militant organizations outside Iran.  According to Sagan, the IRGC link 
means that an Iranian nuclear arsenal would be ―under the ostensible control of the 
organization that manages Tehran‘s contacts with foreign terrorists.‖31 
Some analysts argue that an atomic-armed Iran could spark a nuclear arms race in 
the Middle East.  In December 2011, Saudi Arabia, which has icy relations with Tehran, 
suggested it would seek atomic weapons if it were sandwiched between nuclear-armed 
Iran and Israel.
32
  In addition to Saudi Arabia, Mustafa Kibaroglu has argued that Iraq, 
Egypt and Turkey would be among the other Middle Eastern states to consider the 
―nuclear option‖ if Tehran successfully developed nuclear weapons.33  Not everyone 
agrees that a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race would be inevitable if Iran got the bomb.  
A recent report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) concluded that 
while, for example, there is a risk Saudi Arabia might seek nuclear arms if Iran gets them, 
it would most likely rely on its ally the United States to provide it with protection and 
                                                 
31
 Ibid, 54. 
32
 Associated Press, ―"Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race," December 6, 2011 
(http://nyti.ms/v1877v) 
33
 Mustafa Kibaroglu, ―Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran‘s Quest for Nuclear 
Power,‖ Middle East Journal, 60:2 (Spring 2006): 224. 
 16 
security – in other words, it would expect the United States to take steps to contain a 
nuclear Iran.
34
  This is an issue I return to in Chapter 7. 
 There is another problem with the idea that Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons 
could lead to a stable balance-of-power in the Middle East – it ignores the possibility that 
Iranian nuclear ambitions might have little or nothing to do with Israel.  Despite President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‘s anti-Israeli rhetoric, the Jewish state is not a key security 
concern for Tehran.  Ray Takeyh views the Iranian invocations of an Israeli threat to Iran 
as ―largely rhetorical, employed by the clerical regime as a means of mobilizing regional 
and domestic opinion behind a range of policy initiatives.‖ 35  Israel, Takeyh adds, is less 
of a military than an ideological threat to Iran and is not the reason for Tehran‘s pursuit 
of nuclear weapons.
36
  Despite the intense anti-Iranian rhetoric that comes regularly out 
of Israel, some Israeli officials have occasionally expressed similar views.
37
 
If not to counter Israel‘s nuclear arsenal, why would Iran want atomic weapons?  
According to Sagan, there are three reasons why countries strive to become nuclear 
powers – to protect themselves from an external security threat, to satisfy the ―parochial 
interests‖ of domestic actors, or to achieve a status symbol and enhance the country‘s 
reputation.  While all three of those reasons could apply to Iran‘s pursuit of a nuclear 
deterrent, Sagan argues that the first one – the need for protection from an external threat 
and assurance that the current power structures can remain in place – is the crucial 
motivating factor for Tehran‘s current leadership. 
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Iran is, mostly, a country that wants nuclear weapons to dissuade an 
attack.  It sits in a perennially unstable region, has long faced a belligerent 
Iraq, and now wants to stand up to Washington‘s calls for regime 
change.
38
 
 
In Short, Iran‘s Islamic leadership suffers from an insecurity complex and considers 
nuclear empowerment as the best way to shield itself against attempts at ―regime change‖ 
of the kind the U.S. military carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan – and in Iran in 1953.  
According to Western intelligence sources, Iran‘s leaders concluded that the reason the 
United States invaded Iraq in 2003 but left North Korea alone was that it feared 
Pyongyang might soon have a nuclear device while the U.S. government was fairly 
confident Baghdad did not – despite Washington‘s public claims to have intelligence 
suggesting Saddam Hussein had revived his clandestine nuclear weapons program.
39
 
According to George Perkovich, in addition the United States, Iran also senses 
potential danger coming from two other countries – Iraq and Pakistan – one of which 
possesses nuclear weapons and the other of which tried but failed to acquire them.
40
  The 
United States, Iran‘s principal enemy, has long been militarily active in the Middle East.  
Until recently it was an occupying force in two countries bordering Iran – Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  While the U.S. military is no longer occupying Iraq, it does not plan to 
withdraw the bulk of its forces from Afghanistan until 2014.  The perceived U.S. menace 
on its doorstep is a source of insecurity for the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Perkovich and Takeyh both cite Iranian fears about Iraq.  Iran‘s concerns about 
Baghdad, against which it fought a war from 1980 to 1988, have undoubtedly subsided 
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somewhat since the collapse of Saddam Hussein‘s regime as result of the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Bilateral relations between Iran and Iraq have improved in 
recent years.  Nevertheless, Iraq remains highly unstable to this day, a fact that is a source 
of unease for Iran.   
Iran‘s prolonged war with Iraq has done much to condition the Iranian 
worldview and behavior. Iraq‘s use of chemical weapons against Iran —
with impunity, if not tacit acceptance of Western powers — has reinforced 
Iran‘s suspicions of international order. For many within the Islamic 
Republic‘s leadership, the only way to safeguard Iran‘s interests is to 
develop an independent nuclear deterrent.
41
 
 
Another of Iran‘s long-term security concerns, Perkovich argues, is its nuclear-armed 
neighbor Pakistan, which also emerged as a halfhearted U.S. ally after the September 11, 
2001 attacks.  One of the roots of predominantly Shiite Iran‘s fears about Pakistan is the 
way Pakistani intelligence services have nurtured Wahhabi fundamentalism, an offshoot 
of Sunni Islam imported from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Pakistan also 
supported the Taliban, who, despite being a mutual enemy of Iran‘s foe the United States, 
have proven to be no friend of Iran and remain active in Afghanistan. 
The Taliban were inveterately hostile to Iran.  In the summer of 
1998, just months after the nuclear tests, the Taliban assassinated 
nine Iranian diplomats in the Shia-majority region of western 
Afghanistan.  Sectarian Sunni groups regularly murder Shiites in 
Pakistan.
42
 
 
Once again, seen from the perspective of a realist, having nuclear arms to counter 
potential threats from Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, the United States and elsewhere makes 
perfect sense. 
Iran likely perceives other potential threats in the region.  Recently published U.S. 
State Department cables obtained by the whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks confirmed 
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that Iran is not on the friendliest of terms with some of its Arab neighbors, which also 
view Tehran‘s nuclear ambitions with suspicion.  Saudi Arabia and other Arab states 
have reportedly encouraged Washington to use military force to deal with Iran‘s nuclear 
program.
43
  Iranian authorities are doubtless aware of those discussions, and those in 
Tehran who support the development of atomic weapons most likely see them as yet 
another argument for acquiring a powerful nuclear deterrent. 
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Chapter 3 – Missed Opportunities 
Introduction 
The history of diplomatic endeavors to resolve the crisis over Iran‘s nuclear 
program date back 10 years.  The various attempts to resolve the crisis diplomatically 
began with a May 2003 offer by Iran to open up a dialogue with the United States aimed 
at resolving the two countries‘ many bilateral problems, including Tehran‘s nuclear 
program.  Washington repudiated the offer without taking the time to determine whether 
the Iranians were serious.  This was the first major missed opportunity for Iran and the 
West.  That next came during attempts by Britain, France and Germany – the ―EU3‖ – to 
persuade Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program.  That process may have been 
doomed from the start, since the United States not only refused to participate but 
denigrated and undermined the Europeans‘ efforts.  Eventually the European trio came 
close to a deal with Iran in 2004.  The Iranians were prepared to suspend their full 
program provided they were permitted to run a small cascade of centrifuges under close 
IAEA supervision.  Then IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, who in 2005 
shared the Nobel Peace Prize with the IAEA for his nonproliferation efforts, encouraged 
the Europeans to accept the Iranian proposal since the small cascade would be under 
IAEA safeguards and monitoring.  But the Europeans, knowing that the United States 
would disapprove, rejected the idea and insisted on a suspension of all enrichment work.  
In 2005, conservative former Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected 
president.  Closer in views to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the time, 
Ahmadinejad was less inclined to reach a deal with the Europeans than his reformist 
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predecessor Mohammad Khatami.  The EU3 process collapsed after Iran decided in late 
2005 to resume enrichment and expand its centrifuge program.   
In early 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran‘s nuclear program to 
the U.N. Security Council, which demanded that Tehran halt enrichment work or face 
sanctions.  To date, Iran has been hit with four rounds of U.N. sanctions aimed at 
undermining its nuclear and missile programs and even more draconian U.S. and 
European Union measures that have made it difficult for Iran to carry out international 
financial transactions and sell its oil and gas abroad.  In 2006, the United States reversed 
course on Iran and agreed to join an expanded diplomatic team of the five permanent 
Security Council members and Germany – which became known as the P5-plus-one.  The 
six-nation group has made several offers of incentives to Iran since 2006 in exchange for 
a suspension of Tehran‘s enrichment program.  In May 2010, Turkey and Brazil reached 
an agreement with Iran to revive a nuclear fuel-swap deal with Iran that the IAEA had 
unsuccessfully tried in late 2009 to broker with Tehran, Washington, Moscow and Paris.  
But the Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian agreement received little support from the P5-plus-one 
and collapsed due to the Western push for a fourth U.N. sanctions resolution, which was 
adopted by the Security Council in June 2010. 
So far the P5-plus-one process has also been unsuccessful, but the six powers 
presented Iran with an expanded offer in Almaty, Kazakhstan in February 2013 that 
included potential sanctions relief in exchange for halting higher-level enrichment at an 
underground facility at their latest meeting with Iran‘s nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.  At 
the time of this writing, Iran had not responded in a concrete way but expressed optimism 
about the way the P5-plus-one was responding positively to some of its demands.  The 
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P5-plus-one met with Iran in Almaty again in April 2013 but there were no breakthroughs 
at that meeting either.
44
 
            Iran‘s 2003 Offer 
In May 2003, the Swiss Ambassador to Tehran Tim Guldimann faxed a cover 
letter and a two-page document entitled ―Roadmap‖ to the Near East bureau at the State 
Department in Washington.  It was an unusual document and Guldimann realized that 
from the start.  In his cover letter, the Swiss envoy, who was charged with representing 
U.S. interests in Iran, said that the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei agreed with 
―85%-90%‖ of the roadmap, which had been prepared by Iran‘s ambassador to Paris, 
Sadeq Kharrazi, nephew of then Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi.
45
  The roadmap called 
for bilateral dialogue between Iran and the United States, which have had no diplomatic 
relations since the 1979-81 hostage crisis, covering a wide range of issues, including 
assurances that Iran has no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, would 
cooperate with the IAEA and sign up to the agency‘s Additional Protocol to permit 
intrusive, short-notice nuclear inspections.  The roadmap said Iran pledged the following: 
to cooperate in a crackdown on al Qaeda and other militant organizations; to work with 
the United States to stabilize Iraq; to end ―any material support to Palestinian militant 
groups‖ such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad; to work on transforming the Lebanese militant 
group Hezbollah into a ―mere political organization‖; and to accept the Saudi proposal 
for a two-state solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  In return, the Iranians 
wanted a ―halt in U.S. hostile behavior,‖ an end to all sanctions, an end to U.S. 
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interference in Iranian internal and external affairs, recognition of Iran‘s legitimate 
security interests in the region and pursuit of anti-Iranian terrorists, above all the People‘s 
Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) in Iraq.   
After more than two decades of icy, occasionally conflictual relations, often 
characterized by mutual insults – the United States had become the ―Great Satan‖ for 
Iran, and Iran a nation of ―mad mullahs‖ for many in the United States – it was an 
unusual proposal for the Iranians.  The timing said a lot.  It came on the heels of the swift 
toppling of Saddam Hussein‘s regime in neighboring Iraq and the U.S. military‘s entry 
into Baghdad on April 9, 2003.  The ease with which the U.S. military defeated the Iraqi 
army, widely considered to have been the most powerful Arab military force at the time, 
had clearly rattled the Iranian leadership.  Since U.S. President George W. Bush had 
labeled Iran a member of an ―axis of evil‖ of states seeking WMD in his 2002 State of the 
Union address
46
, Iranian leaders became worried they were next in line for regime 
change.  ―In Tehran, the clergy faced a new and grim reality,‖ wrote Trita Parsi.  
―America‘s encirclement of Iran was now complete. During their twenty-four-year reign, 
the clerics had seldom felt so vulnerable.‖47  This vulnerability, Parsi argues, led to the 
roadmap Guldimann faxed to the State Department and, as a backup, to Representative 
Bob Ney from Ohio, the only member of Congress at the time who spoke Farsi.  Ney 
could help ensure that the proposal reached the White House and did not languish on a 
desk at the ―Foggy Bottom‖.48 
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If the Iranians were serious about the proposal – Guldimann and Parsi both 
believe they were and there is no available evidence to contradict their view – the U.S. 
reaction was a disappointment.  While a number of State Department officials believe 
Washington should have accepted the Iranian offer of negotiations, Vice President Dick 
Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld dismissed the proposal with a simple argument: 
―We don‘t speak to evil.‖49  That was not all the White House did.  It moved to retaliate 
against Guldimann for supposedly departing from his mandate of merely relaying 
messages without interpretation between Tehran and Washington.  The White House 
disliked Guldimann‘s activism. 
Instead of simply rejecting the Iranian offer, the Bush administration 
decided to punish the Swiss for having delivered the proposal in the ﬁrst 
place. Only a few days after its delivery, Washington rebuked Guldimann 
and the Swiss government for having overstepped its diplomatic 
mandate.
50
  
 
While it is not clear if the proposal would have led anyway, the swift rejection of the 
roadmap was a mistake and may have been a major lost opportunity at a time when the 
stars were more aligned for successfully improving U.S.-Iranian relations than at any 
time since 1979.  
An opportunity for a major breakthrough had been willfully wasted. Many 
former Bush administration officials admit that the nonresponse was a 
mistake. The proposal came at an opportune time. Tehran did not have a 
functioning nuclear program, and they were not swimming in oil revenues 
from soaring energy demand.
51
 
 
It is impossible to say whether negotiations with the Iranians in May 2003 would have 
led anywhere, but the refusal to follow up on the proposal was unwise and irresponsible.  
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former senior Iranian nuclear negotiator, described the 2003 
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offer as an ―incredible opportunity‖52 that was brushed aside by the Bush administration, 
which believed there was no point in negotiating with Iran when it could press ahead with 
plans for regime change on its own terms.  Mousavian said the rejection had far-reaching 
consequences inside Iran‘s leadership and only further convinced hardline conservatives 
that the United States was not interested in diplomacy: ―The absence of a response to Iran 
in 2003 convinced Tehran that Washington was not sincere in its stated desire for 
rapprochement.‖53  New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof described the Bush 
administration‘s refusal to respond to Iran‘s offer as ―diplomatic mismanagement of the 
highest order.‖54  Suzanne Maloney raised doubts about whether the May 2003 proposal 
would have led anywhere, but she was also critical of the Bush administration‘s policies 
and general failure to seize the opportunities available to it to improve relations with Iran. 
(W)ith the wisdom of hindsight, it is clear that the Bush administration‘s 
miscalculations – based in part on a wholesale misreading of Iran‘s 
internal political dynamics – forfeited perhaps the best opportunity in 
recent history to generate real momentum on Iran.
55
 
 
Ray Takeyh argues that the U.S. snub of the 2003 offer undermined the position of Iran‘s 
moderates within the country‘s complicated power structures, helping to ensure that a 
diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff would be that much more difficult to achieve.  
The reformists were later definitively sidelined after Ahmadinejad was elected president 
in 2005 and replaced by hard-line conservatives
56
, who initially showed no interest in 
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reaching a deal with the West and dismissed the efforts of Iranian negotiators who 
appeared to be trying to resolve the nuclear standoff. 
 The EU3 (2003-2005) 
 In the summer of 2003, Britain, France and Germany quietly proposed 
negotiations with Iran intended to persuade Tehran to freeze what they feared was a 
burgeoning nuclear arms program.  According to news reports of the negotiations at the 
time, the Bush administration was not pleased about the EU3 initiative, illustrating the 
wide gulf between the United States under President Bush and Europe.  Even Britain 
disagreed with its close ally Washington on whether to engage with Tehran or isolate it.
57
  
Two of the three members of the EU3 – France and Germany – had vigorously opposed 
the Bush administration‘s attempts to persuade the U.N. Security Council to adopt a 
resolution explicitly authorizing an invasion of Iraq on the basis of dubious U.S. claims 
that Saddam Hussein had revived his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
programs.  The United States and Britain chose to attack Iraq without a clear U.N. 
authorization, assembling a ―coalition of the willing,‖ a group of several dozen states58, 
most of which provided little or no actual military support in the war.  After the relatively 
smooth initial invasion of Iraq and the swift toppling of Saddam‘s regime, the Americans 
failed to establish law and order and the country descended into violent chaos and 
sectarian warfare for years.   
 Concern about the rush to war in Iraq amid unsubstantiated allegations about Iraqi 
WMD activities was one of the reasons Britain, France and Germany decided to open a 
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dialogue with Tehran.  Given that the allegations about Iraq‘s nuclear and other WMD 
programs turned out to be false, negotiators from the EU3 were keen not to rush to any 
hasty conclusions about Iran.  It became clear from my own conversations with European 
diplomats involved in the negotiations at the time that in addition to defusing the 
escalating nuclear standoff with Iran, Britain, France and Germany had two principal 
goals: to make it impossible for the United States to take hasty military action against 
Iran as it had in Iraq, and to show that it was possible to resolve such crises at the 
negotiating table rather rushing to war.
59
  
Hardliners in the Bush administration were nonplussed.  The hawkish Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton openly 
criticized London, Paris and Berlin for ―naively‖ talking with Iran, accusing them of 
effectively helping Tehran buy time to secretly continue along the path to nuclear 
weapons.
60
  By October 2003, the EU3 had reached a general understanding with Iran on 
the goals of their negotiations.  The British, French and German foreign ministers flew to 
Tehran for a high-profile meeting with their Iranian counterpart.  On October 21, 2003, 
the four foreign ministers agreed on a communiqué in which Tehran pledged to cooperate 
fully with the IAEA investigation of its past nuclear activities and to halt enrichment and 
plutonium reprocessing work for an unspecified period of time.  That communiqué 
included the following declaration: 
The Iranian authorities reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in 
Iran's defense doctrine and that its nuclear program and activities have 
been exclusively in the peaceful domain. They reiterated Iran's 
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commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime ... (W)hile Iran has a 
right within the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes it has decided voluntarily to suspend all 
uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.
61
 
 
Talking with the EU3 was not without risks for the Iranian government, which was 
headed at the time by the reformist President Mohammad Khatami.  According to 
Mousavian, the process ―took the wind out of the sails of the American push for 
international convergence against Tehran‘s interests, which could have ended in a 
repetition of Iraq‘s experience.‖62  But he noted that some Iranian media were referring to 
the government‘s willingness to negotiate with the EU3 and suspend its nuclear fuel work 
as ―giving in to the pressures of the West.‖63  In exchange for the suspension, Britain and 
France agreed to use their veto powers to block any proposed punitive action against Iran 
in the event Washington succeeded in persuading the IAEA Board of Governors in 
Vienna to refer the Iranian nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council in New York.  
Mousavian described that pledge from Britain and France as one of the most important 
results of what became known as the Sa‘dabad Agreement – the meeting was held at the 
Sa‘dabad palace in Tehran – and a ―major diplomatic breakthrough for Iran.‖64  The 
communiqué also said Iran would accede to the IAEA‘s Additional Protocol, which 
would enable agency inspectors to conduct more intrusive inspections than under the 
IAEA‘s standard Safeguards Agreements with its member states and NPT signatories.   
After the agreement was signed, one of the details that needed clarification was 
what exactly the suspension of ―all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities‖ 
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meant in practical terms and how it would be verified.  It was understood that the IAEA 
would verify the suspension, but agreeing on a list of specific activities to be included in 
the freeze proved difficult.  Iran attempted to define the suspension in the narrowest 
possible terms, while the Europeans and ElBaradei sought a much broader suspension.  
Mousavian claims in his book that ElBaradei informed the Iranians that a narrower 
suspension of enrichment would be acceptable and later, under pressure from 
Washington, informed Tehran that the suspension would have to include not only actual 
enrichment but also a halt to the production and assembly of centrifuge components.
65
  
ElBaradei indicates in his own memoirs that a narrower suspension would have been 
acceptable to Iran and the IAEA.  
Once again we found ourselves at an intersection of technology and 
politics.  A purely technical definition would only require the suspension 
of the introduction of nuclear material into the centrifuge cascade. The 
Iranians would have been happy with this; they wanted the narrowest 
possible limitation.  But since the suspension was intended as a 
confidence-building measure, the Europeans wanted a broader 
definition.
66
 
 
Iran begrudgingly accepted the broader definition of an enrichment suspension, ensuring 
the continued support of the IAEA chief and further talks with the increasingly suspicious 
Europeans.  While there was no hard proof that Iran was pursuing atomic weapons at the 
time, each successive quarterly IAEA report made clear that the Iranians were 
withholding information about their past nuclear activities and not fully cooperating with 
agency inspectors.  As a result, the Europeans were slowly coming around to 
Washington‘s view that Iran might simply be using negotiations to play for time, though 
they refused to give up.   
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In 2004, the EU3 and Iran had a series of further disputes about what should and 
should not be included in the suspension.  Tehran decided to continue testing its uranium 
conversion plant at Isfahan, a facility that produces uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feed 
material for enrichment centrifuges.  In his June 2004 report to the IAEA Board of 
Governors, ElBaradei said testing at the Isfahan plant was ―at variance with the Agency‘s 
previous understanding as to the scope of Iran‘s decision regarding suspension.‖67  Iran 
continued to press for the right to continue with a small-scale enrichment facility and to 
keep operating its uranium conversion plant, though it was willing to temporarily forgo 
industrial scale enrichment at its Natanz plant for some years.  These demands led to 
further friction between Iran and the EU3.
68
 
There was also the important question of what Iran would receive in exchange for 
the suspension.  In 2004, the kinds of incentives on offer from Britain, France and 
Germany were European support for Iran‘s membership in the World Trade Organization 
and loans by international financial institutions.
69
  The EU3 also proposed negotiations 
on a wide range of political and economic issues, including ―firm guarantees‖ for 
European cooperation on peaceful nuclear technology.
70
  With the election of 
Ahmadinejad, a conservative who was widely viewed as representing the views of the 
supreme leader, in June 2005, pressure was mounting inside Iran to resume enrichment.  
In the view of ElBaradei, the European failure to deliver on a number of their promised 
incentives for Iran added fuel to the fire.
71
  For instance, the final European proposal to 
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the Iranians did not include nuclear power reactors, just smaller-scale research reactors, 
which ElBaradei said was due to fears about how the United States would react. 
The French could have provided nuclear technology to Iran, except that 
Areva, the French company, was unwilling to jeopardize its relationship 
with the United States, its biggest market.  The United States had refused 
to give the green light to Areva, so the company‘s offer made a vague 
statement about opening up their foreign fuel market to the Iranians.
72
 
 
In the end, no European nuclear firm was seriously interested in doing business in Iran, 
making it impossible for the EU3 to include concrete promises of atomic technology to 
Tehran.  
 In 2005, the Iranians and Europeans exchanged a series of proposals in an attempt 
to salvage their increasingly shaky discussions.  In the course of the year, Iran presented a 
total of four proposals to the EU3 detailing what it was willing to do and what it wanted 
in exchange, the first in January 2005 and three clarifications in March, April and July.
73
  
Among the steps Iran offered to take were: a pledge not to pursue weapons of mass 
destruction;
74
 cooperation on combating terrorism; regional security cooperation, 
including in Iraq and Afghanistan; adoption and implementation of the IAEA Additional 
Protocol; non-stop monitoring at important facilities; continuation of its enrichment 
suspension for six months; and limiting the expansion of its enrichment program.  In 
exchange Iran wanted guarantees that its nuclear facilities would not be attacked, a 
declaration from the EU that Iran was a major energy supplier for Europe, access to 
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European nuclear technology, a commitment from European firms to build power plants 
in Iran and normalization of Tehran‘s status under G8 rules for sensitive nuclear 
exports.
75
   
In August 2005, the EU3 presented its own comprehensive offer to Iran, which 
included demands that went well beyond what the Iranians had been willing to offer.  It 
did not consent to Iranian enrichment but offered guarantees that Iran would have a 
supply of low-enriched uranium fuel for civilian reactors and the possibility of storing 
nuclear fuel in a third country.  Tehran would commit not to pursue nuclear fuel cycle 
work for 10 years, after which the suspension would be reviewed.  The EU3 also wanted 
Iran to commit to remain in the NPT.  In exchange, the EU would recognize Iran‘s 
importance for Europe as a source of fossil fuels and offer security cooperation in the 
region, including on drug trafficking and in Afghanistan and Iraq.
76
  (Russia supported 
the EU3 efforts and in November 2005 offered to host a Russian-Iranian joint venture 
enrichment facility on Russian territory, an idea that generated little enthusiasm in Iran.
77
)  
Iran rejected the proposal because it did not recognize Tehran‘s right to enrich uranium.   
In August 2005, newly elected President Ahmadinejad explained Iran‘s repudiation of the 
EU3 offer: ―We are logical and respect international rules, but will not give in to those 
who want to violate our rights.‖78  It was a complaint that was to be heard frequently in 
the West‘s fitful negotiations with Iran in the years ahead – the demands being placed on 
Iran were a breech of its rights to nuclear technology under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
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There never was an offer that satisfied both the Iranians and the EU3.  As a result, 
the negotiations fell apart.  Once Ahmadinejad took office and adopted a more 
aggressive, nationalistic tone on the Iranian nuclear program, it became clear that it 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to reach an agreement.  However well 
intentioned, the EU3 negotiations were probably doomed from the start because they 
lacked the blessing of the United States, whose opposition to engaging with Iran made it 
impossible for the Europeans to put any enticing incentives on the table for Iran.  The 
most outspoken critic of the EU3 process, John Bolton, correctly identified the premise of 
the EU3 process, though he failed to acknowledge that Washington‘s Iran policy, which 
he helped formulate, played a central role in the demise of the EU3 process.  
 The entire EU3 effort was premised on the view that they could handle an 
―axis of evil‖ member better than we had handled Iraq, and that Iran could 
be talked out of pursuing nuclear weapons.
79
 
 
Bolton believed negotiations were a waste of time and that the Iranians were using them 
as diplomatic cover to avoid a referral to the U.N. Security Council, where it could be put 
under sanctions.  It is possible that Bolton was right.  But Mousavian, who was closely 
involved in the EU3-Iran negotiations, insists Iran was ready to cut a deal and did 
everything it could to reach an agreement.
80
   
ElBaradei, whom Bolton and other hawks in the Bush administration despised and 
sought to oust as head of the IAEA,
81
 also believed a deal would have been possible at 
the time.  Still angry about U.S. and British deceptions regarding Iraq‘s non-existent 
WMD, ElBaradei opposed referral of the Iran case to the Security Council, lest it become 
the target of another round of U.S.-led regime change.  He was a strong supporter of the 
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EU3 process.  ElBaradei has made clear that mistakes were made during the negotiations 
– above all the Europeans‘ refusal to allow Iran to operate a small enrichment cascade 
under IAEA monitoring and the lack of any proper incentives for Tehran – that led to the 
failure of the process. 
(T)he West‘s insistence on taking a hard line – refusing Iran‘s request to 
retain some small element of their nuclear program – achieved nothing.  
The most amorphous of principles trumped pragmatism.  Had the EU3 
offered Iran a reasonable package, with concrete benefits, the Iranians, I 
believe, would have been willing to suspend their enrichment program, or 
at least to limit it to a small R&D operation while negotiations toward a 
grand bargain continued.  Iran‘s requirement was access to Western 
technology – both nuclear technology and other technology they had been 
denied under U.S. sanctions. Because of U.S. opposition, such an offer did 
not materialize.
82
 
   
Mousavian echoes ElBaradei‘s view, saying that the EU3 ―missed a great many 
opportunities for a face-saving solution during nuclear talks just because the United 
States was not prepared to play a constructive role to support an initiative other than its 
own ramping up of pressure during negotiations from 2003 to 2005.‖83  But he 
acknowledges that Iran, too, made mistakes.  Supreme Leader Khamenei had 
demonstrated ―reluctance and reservation,‖ which undermined reformist President 
Khatami‘s drive to secure a deal that would end the nuclear standoff with the West and 
avoid sanctions.
84
  The Khatami government‘s push for a deal with the Europeans was 
sharply criticized in the Iranian press, meaning that the Iranian negotiators found 
themselves under pressure not only from ―hawks in Washington and Tel Aviv‖ but also 
from Iranian conservatives suspicious of the West and other domestic critics.
85
  That 
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made it more difficult for the Iranian delegation to compromise, since they were afraid of 
appearing weak back.  The result was failure. 
By the beginning of 2006, the EU3 had broken off talks with Iran and agreed to 
support the Bush administration‘s calls to refer Iran‘s nuclear dossier to the U.N. Security 
Council.  The IAEA Board of Governors formally took that step on February 4, 2006, by 
passing a resolution that referred the matter to the Security Council.
86
  That referral 
prompted Iran to suspend implementation of the Additional Protocol, which it had signed 
and pledged to implement but never ratified.
87
  Tehran ignored the Security Council‘s 
calls to stop enriching uranium, and in late December, the 15-nation council passed its 
first of four sanctions resolutions against Iran, resolution 1737.
88
 
There is one final point worth raising here when looking back at the failed EU3 
initiative – the role of Mohamed ElBaradei.  Bolton was not the only person criticizing 
ElBaradei‘s handling of Iran during his tenure at the IAEA.  British, French and German 
negotiators often told me during the years of the EU3-Iran negotiations that they felt 
ElBaradei was undermining them at times.  One of the points the EU3 tried to make clear 
to the Iranians was that failure to reach a deal would result in a Security Council referral, 
something the Iranians wanted to avoid.  But European diplomats said that ElBaradei was 
doing his best to make a Security Council referral out of the question, which they said 
made the Iranians less willing to compromise.  In other words, they felt ElBaradei wanted 
them to use an all-carrots-and-no-sticks approach. 
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On the other side, ElBaradei was frustrated with what he saw as the Europeans‘ 
failure to compromise or offer proper incentives.  But the EU3, and eventually the 
Americans when they began supporting the Europeans, grew increasingly frustrated with 
what they saw as ElBaradei‘s attempts to undermine their push to keep the pressure on 
Tehran.  One of the things that frustrated the Western powers was what they regarded as 
ElBaradei‘s obsession with the U.S. approach to Iraq and his determination to prevent its 
repeat in Iran, even if that meant softening the IAEA‘s quarterly reports on Iran to the 
agency‘s board of governors, thus making the case for a Security Council referral less 
solid. 
Determined to prevent another war, ElBaradei did everything to ensure 
that his reports on IAEA inspections of Iran's nuclear program could not 
be used to justify a military attack against the Islamic Republic. Over the 
objections of the IAEA Department of Safeguards, ElBaradei and his 
political and legal advisers regularly toned down language in inspection 
reports and removed allegations they felt were less certain than others.
89
 
 
It was not only American and European officials who had doubts about ElBaradei‘s 
approach to Iran.  Some of ElBaradei‘s colleagues at the IAEA felt that he overestimated 
his own ability to persuade the Iranians to cooperate with the IAEA and reach an 
agreement.  Two former heads of the IAEA safeguards division, Pierre Goldschmidt of 
Belgium and Olli Heinonen of Finland, encouraged ElBaradei to take a tougher public 
stand on Iran but he refused.
90
  According to Heinonen, ElBaradei thought the Iranians 
simply needed coaching and coaxing in order to cut a deal with the Europeans, but he 
eventually realized this may have been naïve on his part.  "He had had faith in the 
Iranians that they were ready to resolve their problems but didn't know how to do it,‖ 
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Heinonen said. ―I think he lost his illusions in January 2008. He didn't go back (to 
Tehran) afterwards and his line on Iran hardened.‖91   
 ElBaradei‘s reticence about the Security Council was understandable.  Not only 
had the council failed to prevent the war in Iraq, when the IAEA board of governors 
referred to New York the case of North Korea‘s nuclear program and Pyongyang‘s 
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, the Security Council dropped the issue after a single 
round of consultations and outsourced the problem to a non-U.N. forum known as the 
―six-party talks‖ involving the two Koreas, China, Russia, Japan and the United States.  
ElBaradei was furious about this.  He castigated the council for its inaction on North 
Korea, which conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, saying it may have set ―the worst 
precedent of all if it conveys the message that acquiring a nuclear deterrent, by whatever 
means, will neutralize any compliance mechanism and bring about preferred treatment.‖92 
 This is not to say ElBaradei or the EU3 was right or wrong in his or their 
approach but to highlight how important players in the 2003-2005 negotiations with Iran 
disagreed on strategy and at times worked at cross purposes, questioning, doubting and 
perhaps undermining each other in ways that did not help bring the Iran nuclear dispute 
any closer to a diplomatic solution.   
P5-plus-one (2006-present) 
As the EU3 process was collapsing, the Bush administration dropped its 
opposition to engagement with Iran.  Condoleezza Rice left her post as National Security 
Adviser, where she had developed a reputation as a staunch supporter of Bush‘s policies 
in Iraq, and took over from Colin Powell as Secretary of State in August 2005.  Unlike 
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her predecessor Colin Powell, who had little influence with the Bush administration due 
to his opposition to the push for war in Iraq, Rice was taken seriously at the White House.  
As the sectarian violence in Iraq grew worse and worse, hawks like Bolton, whom Bush 
named U.S. ambassador to the United Nations as a recess appointment, were sidelined. 
Rice‘s reversal on Iran came after European officials made clear to her in 2005 that they 
saw Washington, not Tehran, as the biggest impediment to a deal with Iran on its nuclear 
program.
93
  Rice had a change of heart and, with the aid of the leaders of France and 
Germany, managed to convince Bush that it was time to consider some form of 
engagement with Iran, albeit in a group setting that would demonstrate how the United 
States had the international community on its side.
94
  Rice, who had been with Bush from 
the beginning and was seen as one of his most trusted lieutenants, persuaded the president 
that it was in the best interests of the United States to begin engaging, at least indirectly, 
with Iran via an expanded multilateral group that included the EU3, the United States, 
Russia and China – the P5-plus-one.95  EU High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Javier Solana of Spain, became the group‘s principal interlocutor with 
Iran, so the entire 27-nation EU became a de facto junior member of the P5-plus-one. 
In June 2006, Solana delivered the P5-plus-one‘s first offer to Iran.  It included 
and expanded on what the EU3 had offered Tehran a year earlier.  In the new package of 
incentives was an additional European promise to build a light-water civilian nuclear 
reactor if Tehran stopped enriching uranium.
96
  The United States added an offer of spare 
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airplane parts for Tehran‘s aging fleet of aircraft to the incentives mix.97  Other ―carrots‖ 
included nuclear fuel guarantees, halting discussion of Iran‘s nuclear program at the 
Security Council, and cooperation on civil aviation, telecommunications, agriculture and 
other fields between Iran, the United States and EU.
98
  In exchange, Iran would suspend 
all enrichment-related and plutonium reprocessing activities and resume implementation 
of and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol.
99
 
Iran did not accept the P5-plus-one offer but its reaction was less categorical than 
its dismissal of the EU3 proposal the previous year.  In its formal response to the six-
nation group, Iran said it found the P5-plus-one‘s offer to be ―containing useful 
foundations and capacities for comprehensive and long-term cooperation between the two 
sides.‖100  But it said that it was ―not clear for the Islamic Republic of Iran how the 
suspension of Iran's nuclear activities would help ‗to create the right conditions for 
negotiations‘.‖  Tehran wanted an end to discussions of its nuclear program in the 
Security Council, security guarantees, and an end to all unilateral sanctions against it.
101
  
With an agreement remaining elusive, the P5-plus-one pressed on with its dual-track 
approach to the Iran issue – keeping the door open to dialogue and further negotiations 
while applying pressure in the form of sanctions.  The first U.N. Security Council 
sanctions resolution (number 1737) was adopted on December 23, 2006, the second 
(1747) on March 24, 2007, the third (1803) on March 3, 2008, and the fourth and 
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toughest sanctions resolution (1929) on June 9, 2010.  I will discuss the sanctions against 
Iran in detail in the Chapter 5. 
As the council was putting the final touches on what became resolution 1803 in 
March 2008, the third U.N. sanctions resolution against Iran, the P5-plus-one was 
preparing to resubmit its June 2006 offer to Iran but with more specifics.  Iran‘s Foreign 
Minister Manouchehr Mottaki preempted the P5-plus-one offer with a May 2008 
counterproposal that had few specifics.  There was no mention of a willingness to 
suspend enrichment.  On the contrary, it suggested the establishment of ―enrichment and 
nuclear-fuel consortiums in different parts of the world – including in Iran.‖102  In other 
words, Iran was proposing the establishment of a uranium enrichment joint venture and 
would allow other countries to participate – similar to the previously mentioned Russian 
proposal to host a jointly owned Russian-Iranian enrichment plan in Russia.  However, 
Iran was insisting that it be on Iranian soil.   
In August 2008, the P5-plus-one responded with their own updated proposal, 
which, among other things, said that the group would consider supporting Iranian nuclear 
research and development once confidence in the peaceful nature of its atomic program 
had been restored.
103
  They also offered a reaffirmation that countries should avoid taking 
military action in a way that is inconsistent with the United Nations Charter, as well as 
steps toward normalizing economic and political relations with Iran, including support for 
Iranian WTO membership.
104
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Once again the negotiations hit a familiar impasse.  Iran refused to suspend its 
enrichment program, while the P5-plus-one – a group that includes Iran‘s traditional 
allies on the Security Council, Russia and China – refused to abandon its dual-track 
strategy of engagement and pressure.  In 2009, an opportunity arose for a new round of 
engagement.  The Iranians were looking for fresh fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor 
(TRR), a facility built by the Americans in 1967 that Iran uses to make medical isotopes 
for cancer radiation therapy.  The Iranians asked the IAEA for help securing fresh fuel for 
the TRR and ElBaradei suggested a multilateral arrangement involving the United States, 
Russia and France overseen by the IAEA.  The idea was that Iran would use its own 
enriched uranium stocks as fuel for the research reactor.  Iran would ship the vast 
majority of its low enriched uranium stocks to Russia for enrichment up to 19.5 percent 
and from there it would be sent to France for processing into specialized fuel 
assemblies.
105
  The United States would facilitate the deal by giving it its blessing.  It 
would take a year to prepare the fuel assemblies for the TRR, which meant that Iran 
would be left with very little enriched uranium on its territory during that time, defusing 
tensions and giving breathing space for further negotiations with Iran.
106
  The deal was 
agreed upon in principle at a meeting of the P5-plus-one with Iran in Geneva in October 
2009, though it was never realized.  Iran accused the West of trying to trick it into giving 
up its enriched uranium and began adding new conditions.  This came amid an 
atmosphere in which the Majlis, Iran‘s parliament, was increasingly critical of 
Ahmadinejad, who was a strong supporter of the TRR proposal.  Negotiations remained 
in limbo until Brazil and Turkey attempted to revive the TRR in the spring of 2010.  The 
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Brazilian and Turkish initiative came as the P5-plus-one were putting the finishing 
touches on what was to become Security Council resolution 1929, the toughest U.N. Iran 
sanctions resolution to date.  But the morning after the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey 
and Brazil signed the so-called Tehran Declaration of May 17, 2010 to revive the stalled 
fuel-swap deal
107
 and avert a new round of U.N. sanctions, Hillary Clinton told a Senate 
committee that Washington‘s response to Ankara‘s and Brasilia‘s efforts was that the 
U.S. delegation in New York would circulate a draft sanctions resolution on Iran that 
afternoon.
108
  Brazil and Turkey, both of which were elected members of the Security 
Council, were furious.
109
  On June 9, 2010, they voted against resolution 1929, the only 
no votes ever cast against an Iran sanctions resolution in the Security Council. 
There were a number of reasons for the P5-plus-one decision to press ahead with 
sanctions despite the Brazil-Turkey initiative.  Given that the dual-track strategy on Iran 
called for both engagement and pressure, there was no reason to abandon the sanctions 
drive while pursuing diplomacy.  At the time, U.S. officials said that one of the main 
reasons they disregarded the Tehran Declaration was that Iran was simultaneously 
insisting it would pursue higher level enrichment, raising questions about Tehran‘s 
sincerity.
110
  There was also the fact that the fuel-swap deal was far less significant in 
May 2010 because the Iranians‘ stockpile of enriched uranium had increased 
considerably between the time the TRR deal was first agreed in Geneva in October 2009 
and the date the Tehran Declaration was signed eight months later.
111
  That meant that the 
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percentage of Iran‘s total stockpile of enriched uranium to be shipped out of the country 
was far lower seven months later, making the deal less attractive to the Americans and 
Europeans.
112
  The Western countries also disliked the fact that the Tehran Declaration 
explicitly recognized Iran‘s right to enrich uranium.  But there was another possible 
factor cited by U.S. and European officials to me later on which helped to explain 
Russia‘s and China decision to press ahead with sanctions: the fact that the P5 saw Brazil 
and Turkey as attempting to encroach on their territory by attempting to solve a problem 
that they considered to be their responsibility.
113
  U.S. and European officials expressed 
suspicion about the motives of Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Turkey.  Given that Turkey 
is a neighbor of Iran, its desire to help defuse the nuclear crisis made perfect sense.  
Turkey also has aspirations of solidifying its position a regional power with diplomatic 
influence.  There was more skepticism about Brazil under then President Luiz Inacio 
Lula, who Western diplomats said at the time was less interested in helping resolve the 
Iran problem than in promoting himself as a peace broker and Brazil as a significant 
developing power.
114
  The fact that Brazil aspires to become a permanent member of an 
expanded U.N. Security Council may also have played a role in its desire to show that it 
could succeed where the other big powers could not in securing a breakthrough with Iran.  
In the end, the Brazil-Turkey initiative on Iran was brushed aside by the P5-plus-one. 
The P5-plus-one say they have not given up on Iran.  But nearly seven years after 
they began meeting with the Iranians, the negotiations have not resolved the Iran crisis.  
They did ensure that a tenuous consensus among the five Security Council veto powers 
held until recently, enabling the passage of four sanctions resolutions.  Three years after 
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the fourth U.N. sanctions resolution was adopted, there are no indications that a fifth is on 
its way, but the P5-plus-one continues to meet.  The six powers recently revised their 
2008 offer and presented it to Iran at a meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan in February 2013 
and discussed it further in April.  Details of what exactly the P5-plus-one offered Iran are 
still emerging, but most elements are clear – in addition to keeping what was in the 
previous offers, the P5-plus-one proposed relaxing a Western ban on trade in gold and 
other precious metals and easing the EU ban on imports of Iranian petrochemical 
products.
115
  In exchange, Iran would be required to suspend its higher-level enrichment 
work.  Iran‘s nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili expressed optimism about the progress made 
at the Almaty talks, though U.S. and European officials were more downbeat.
116
  It 
remains to be seen whether the latest round of talks will succeed in bringing the six 
powers and Iran out of their entrenched positions and any closer to a deal that has eluded 
them for the past 10 years.  The P5-plus-one remains a work-in-progress, so it is 
impossible to say now whether it is doomed to failure as the EU3 process was.  The 
prospects for success, however, are not good. 
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Chapter 4 – The Enemy Within and Without: 
Domestic Pressures and Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 
The previous chapters focused on the interaction between Iran and the 
international community, above all the United States and major European powers.  This 
chapter looks at domestic Iranian factors, which have played a crucial role in ensuring the 
failure of Iran‘s negotiations with the West over the past decade.  As former Iranian 
nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian and others have said, various Iranian officials have 
tried to secure a deal with the West for years, only to see their efforts undermined by 
domestic opponents inside the Islamic Republic of Iran.  For every Iranian official willing 
to talk with the West, there are many more willing to line up and criticize him for 
negotiating with the enemy.  One reason for this is that the Iranian leadership has made 
the country‘s nuclear program an issue of national pride, so that abandoning or curtailing 
it would be equivalent to giving up the family jewels.  But national pride does not explain 
why Iran has adopted such a confrontational foreign-policy course toward the United 
States, the European Union, its Arab neighbors and Israel, an approach that has brought 
Iran increasingly painful international sanctions and isolation as it moves ever closer to 
nuclear empowerment.   
As discussed in previous chapters, the main reason Iran‘s leaders have pushed 
ahead with their nuclear program is to ensure Iranian national security and preserve their 
own grip on power.  And the top leaders‘ deep-rooted suspicions toward the West – 
above all on the part of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei – make it highly unlikely 
that they will agree to abandon their quest for a nuclear deterrent. 
 *                             *                          *                           * 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, Iran‘s pursuit of nuclear empowerment makes perfect 
sense from a defensive and strategic point of view.  It is based on a realist assessment of 
its security environment.  Faced with the anarchy of the international arena and fearing 
new attempts at regime change by the United States, or U.S. attempts to dictate policy to 
Iran regarding Tehran‘s role in the Middle East, the Iranian leadership is pursuing a 
nuclear deterrent to ensure it remains in power, keep its enemies at bay and preserve its 
regional influence.  Fears of foreign interference – above all by the United States – are 
deeply ingrained in Iran‘s identity and play a central role in post-revolutionary Iranian 
decision-making.  Iran‘s suspicion of the United States can be traced back to the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency‘s 1953 coup that toppled democratically elected Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and installed the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, as the Iranian leader.  Washington‘s support for Iraq during the 1980-88 Iran-
Iraq war – a conflict that killed between 500,000 and 1.5 million people over the course 
of eight years
117
 – further convinced Iran‘s leadership that the United States could never 
be trusted.  We might add to that the Bush administration‘s careless rejection of Iran‘s 
2003 secret request for negotiations aimed at a rapprochement with the United States, an 
issue discussed in Chapter 3.  In short, Iran‘s mistrust of the West, above all the United 
States, has deep roots and is one of the principal reasons Iran is wary of any overtures by 
Washington, London, Paris and Berlin in negotiations on its nuclear program.
118
  Some of 
Iran‘s post-revolutionary leaders have made a habit of demonizing the United States, 
most famously Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
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Republic of Iran, who in November 1979 described the United States in a speech as ―the 
Great Satan, the wounded snake.‖119  Kenneth Pollack has argued that such images of the 
United States remain fresh in the minds of some of those with power in contemporary 
Iran.  It is part of the revolutionary ideology some of them cling to. 
The men who rule in Tehran today have believed reflexively for fifty years 
that the U.S. government is evil, that it is the source of all the problems in 
the world and the ultimate cause of all of Iran‘s problems.  They defined 
themselves and led their country once they came to power inspired by the 
idea that Iran was the champion of goodness and sanctity and that its God-
given mission was to combat the forces of evil – led by the United 
States.
120
 
 
Pollack notes that not all of those in power in Iran actually believe the myth of the Great 
Satan being responsible for all of Iran‘s troubles and that not everything the United States 
does is evil.
121
  But the idea persists in Iran and cannot be ignored. 
The 1953 coup is essential to understanding what made Iran so suspicious of the 
United States, Britain and other Western powers.  Anoushiravan Ehteshami argues that 
the CIA-organized plot and other interferences have created a kind of national trauma 
that is central to comprehending Iranian foreign policy. 
Iran‘s historical impotence in the face of foreign influence has left a deep 
and seemingly permanent scar on the Iranian psyche, which has also been 
guiding elite thinking for many decades. An almost obsessive 
preoccupation with outside interference in Iran‘s internal affairs has made 
Iranians wary of big-power involvement in the area.
122
 
 
While it was never formally colonized, Britain took over Iran‘s oil industry in the early 
20
th
 century and exploited it to secure cheap fuel for its empire.  London had turned Iran 
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into what was effectively a colonial protectorate in the decades prior to Mossadegh‘s 
1951 nationalization of the oil industry, a move that led Britain to seek out American help 
in toppling Mossadegh. Suzanne Maloney has argued that an important element of Iran‘s 
―anti-imperalist identity is the pursuit of genuine sovereignty and cultural 
authenticity.‖123  These historical factors underpin Iran‘s deep suspicion towards the 
Western powers with which it has been negotiating for years without any success. 
Pollack argues that much of what contemporary Iranians believe about 
Mossadegh is a myth.  He describes Mossadegh as an ineffective reformer who amassed 
―dictatorial powers‖ and became so obsessed with eliminating all foreign influences on 
Iran that he arguably brought the coup that ousted him from power on himself.
124
  One 
could easily argue that Pollack‘s criticism of Mossadegh is a self-serving justification for 
the coup coming from someone who spent many years as a military analyst at the CIA, 
the agency responsible for Mossadegh‘s demise.  But my goal here is not to decide 
whether Mossadegh was a hero or a fraud, but to point that whatever he was in reality, his 
ouster continues to play a central role in the Iranian imagination to this day, making it 
that much more difficult for the United States to reach any kind of sustainable 
rapprochement with the Iranian leadership.  This is a point which Pollack emphasizes. 
Ever since (Mossadegh was overthrown), Iranians – already predisposed 
to conspiracy theories and inevitably blaming everything but the weather 
on foreign subversion – have had one firm, incontrovertible fact with 
which to back all of their assertions and conjecture: the United States did 
overthrow Mossadegh. Neither we nor they can ever escape that truth.  We 
should not forget it; they will not.
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In 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright apologized for the 1953 coup, saying 
the United States ―must bear its fair share of responsibility for the problems that have 
arisen in U.S.-Iranian relations.‖126  President Obama echoed Albright‘s apology in 2009 
when, as a newly elected president determined to reach out to Tehran, he attempted to 
distance himself from the Bush administration‘s aggressive ―axis of evil‖ rhetoric on Iran 
and open the door to renewed U.S.-Iranian dialogue.
127
  Iran remains suspicious of the 
United States.  It has never really accepted those apologies, though it has never closed the 
door on engagement with Washington.  That leaves a thin ray of hope that some kind of 
rapprochement may be possible, provided one finds the proper formula. 
The principle hurdle to an agreement between Iran and the West is the apparent 
immovability of Iran‘s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the final say 
on all domestic and foreign policy matters.  While President Ahmadinejad has generated 
a great deal of attention in the Western press, his real powers in Iran are far more limited 
than Khamenei‘s.  Ahmadinejad has played an increasingly marginal role in Iranian 
politics since his public falling-out with Khamenei in the years following his 2009 re-
election in dubious circumstances that sparked nationwide protests and a severe 
government crackdown.
128
  According to Iran expert Karim Sadjadpour, ―as long as 
Khamenei remains Supreme Leader, a fundamental shift in Iranian domestic and foreign 
policy is unlikely.‖129  Khamenei lacks the religious credentials, charisma and popular 
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support his predecessor Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini enjoyed, leaving Khamenei feeling 
more vulnerable and insecure than Khomeini.  For Khamenei, Sadjadpour argues, the 
Iranian nuclear program is an expression of the ideals of the 1979 revolution, which 
include anti-Western values and ensuring Iran‘s independence and self-sufficiency.130  
That is not something Khamenei would easily abandon because it could be seen as 
cutting himself off from his roots and undermining Iran‘s hard-fought independence.  
For Khamenei, the nuclear program has come to embody the revolution's 
core themes: the struggle for independence, the injustice of foreign 
powers, the necessity of self-sufficiency, and Islam's high esteem for the 
sciences. He wants to ensure that Iran is scientifically and technologically 
advanced enough to be self-sufficient, self-sufficient enough to be 
economically independent, and economically independent enough to be 
politically independent.
131
 
 
Khamenei, writes Sadjadpour, is therefore likely to continue supporting Iran‘s nuclear 
program and to oppose any compromise with the United States and Europe.  Even if he 
wanted a compromise with the West – and his May 2003 overture to Washington could 
indicate that he has at least on one occasion seriously considered the idea – he would not 
do it again without the support of all key Iranian power centers, including the influential 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
132
  This is partly due to the weakening of his 
domestic status in recent years.  That weakening began during the half year of civil unrest 
in Iran after the 2009 presidential election, a period widely referred to as the green 
revolution.  Sadjadpour says that Khamenei‘s influence waned significantly in the wake 
of the green revolution, leaving him more dependent than ever on the IRGC. 
Before the presidential elections, Khamenei appeared to have a lifelong 
lock on the job of supreme leader. But his fate became far less certain after 
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six months of sporadic turmoil. To regain control, he has grown 
increasingly reliant on Iran's vast intelligence networks, security forces 
and military. His future rests most of all in the hands of the Revolutionary 
Guards. With their apparently strong support, Khamenei has refused to 
cede any political ground since the election, on the grounds that 
compromise projects weakness and invites further challenges.
133
 
 
Given the uncertainty of the supreme leader‘s position and the popularity of Iran‘s 
nuclear program among all factions on Iran‘s political scene, compromise and 
rapprochement with the West continue to be unlikely options for Khamenei, despite the 
fact that he continues to approve negotiations with the P5-plus-one and has not ruled out 
direct talks with the Americans.  
Balkan Devlen conducted an analysis of Iranian leaders‘ operational code in an 
attempt to predict how Iran would behave in continued negotiations on its nuclear 
program with the United States and its allies.  As a basis for his analysis, Devlen 
considered two letters President Ahmadinejad sent to the American people and President 
George W. Bush in 2006, which Devlen said had clearly received the blessing of 
Khamenei and reflected a broad consensus among Iran‘s political elite.  Based on his 
mapping of the Iranian leaders‘ operational code – their values, belief system and world 
view – Devlen concluded that Iranian leaders would like to reach a negotiated settlement 
with the United States to defuse the nuclear crisis, but maintain ambivalent feelings 
toward Washington and ―fear that if they show willingness to negotiate, the United States 
could exploit it.‖134   Furthermore, the deep mistrust and relatively low cost of 
                                                 
133
 Ibid  
134
 Balkan Devlen, ―Dealing or Dueling with the United States: Explaining and Predicting Iranian Behavior 
During the Nuclear Crisis,‖ International Studies Review, 12:1 (March 2010), 53. 
 52 
maintaining the current deadlock make the Iranians reluctant to take steps to end the 
nuclear standoff.
135
  
Iranians believe that the United States is willing to endure the 
current situation or even escalate to a militarized conflict, rather 
than negotiating with Iran. What makes the U.S. prefer (according 
to Iran) deadlock over negotiation is not only a hostile view of the 
world … but also that they (the U.S.) have greater control over 
historical developments.
136
 
 
Devlen concluded that Iran‘s leaders believe the United States and Israel know that 
military action against Iran‘s nuclear installations would likely be futile because they are 
spread across the vast country, often underground, while military operations can never 
eradicate Iran‘s nuclear know-how. 
Iranian leaders are undoubtedly aware of such assessments and are likely 
to consider the costs of a low-probability military conflict acceptable when 
considered against the political cost of bowing to the international 
pressures.
137
 
 
I will return to the military option against Iran‘s nuclear program in Chapter 6.  For now 
it is sufficient to note that Devlen‘s analysis adds further credence to the argument that 
the Iranians are unlikely to compromise and can be expected to continue with their 
uranium enrichment program, despite the fact that they would like to reach a settlement 
with the West. This view is consistent with that of Sadjadpour, who as discussed above, 
has also concluded that Khamenei is reluctant to support a compromise. 
There is also the issue of public opinion, which some analysts say has long been 
on the side of continuing with Iran‘s nuclear program, albeit one that is peaceful and not 
intended to produce weapons.
138
  While Iran‘s leaders do not base their decisions on what 
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is popular, they do pay attention to public opinion, as evidenced by the government‘s 
crackdown on negative news coverage in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election 
and the widely reported allegations of voter fraud.  Devlen cites a 2007 poll conducted by 
the Program on International Policy Attitudes, which showed that 84 percent of Iranians 
polled considered having a full nuclear-fuel cycle – including uranium enrichment – 
―very important,‖ while 89 percent of Iranians said it was ―very important‖ for Iran‘s 
economy to develop nuclear energy.
139
  There have been no similar polls since 2007, 
which makes it impossible to gauge current levels of domestic support for Iran‘s nuclear 
program.  It is equally impossible to say how accurate the 2007 poll was.  Takeyh argued 
in 2005 that the Iranian population was opposed to an Iranian nuclear weapons program, 
in contrast to Pakistan and India, where the public wholeheartedly supported the 
development of a nuclear arsenal.
140
  But his assessment was based informal interviews 
and discussions with Iranians, not on empirical poll data.  Takeyh later argued that Iran‘s 
nuclear program has an appeal for Iranian nationalists, who see it as synonymous with 
Iran‘s independence and technical superiority and therefore reject the idea of curtailing it. 
In a peculiar way, the nuclear program and Iran‘s national identity are 
fused in the imagination of many Iranians. To stand against the United 
States on this issue is to validate one‘s revolutionary ardor and sense of 
nationalism. Thus, the notion of compromise and acquiescence has limited 
utility to Iran‘s aggrieved nationalists.141 
 
Takeyh said that after Ahmadinejad took office in 2005 he expended a great deal of effort 
to create a narrative for the Iranian public in which Iran‘s nuclear program was a source 
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of national pride and proof that Iran, the seat of the once mighty Persian empire, is again 
destined for greatness and cannot be stopped by the traditional Western meddlers in 
Iranian politics, above all the United States. 
At a government level, for the past seven years there is no question that 
President Ahmadinejad has framed the nuclear issue as a matter of 
national sovereignty and greatness, and that the resistance of international 
pressure to curtail the nuclear program has become, if not the raison 
d‘être, then at least a pillar of the struggling Islamic republic.142 
 
The scientists involved in Iran‘s nuclear program have their own reasons to 
support progress on the nuclear program.  Not only is there national pride at play, there is 
personal intellectual pride for Iranian scientists who have found themselves cut off from 
the international scientific community because of the sanctions and widespread 
suspicions about the nature of Iran‘s nuclear program around the world.  This has helped 
motivate some Iranian nuclear scientists to close ranks with country‘s leadership, which 
considers them to be an extremely valuable element of Iranian society. 
Iran‘s pariah status has ironically engendered an esprit de corps within its 
scientific community. Researchers resent being shunned by their 
international colleagues, and are annoyed at being excluded from 
collaborative work with Western centers of learning that are crucial to 
scientific advancement. In today‘s Iran, rulers and scientists have crafted a 
national compact whereby the state provides the resources and the 
scientists furnish their expertise.
143
 
 
The assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists in recent years, which Iran has blamed on 
Israel and the United States, have demonstrated that the national compact between rulers 
and scientists can have lethal consequences for any scientist or engineer intimately 
involved in the Iranian nuclear project.
144
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If Khamenei woke up one morning and decided to compromise with the West and 
suspend Iran‘s enrichment program, could he make it happen?  The simple answer is yes.  
But it would be extremely difficult for Khamenei to find the necessary support among 
Iran‘s motley mix of conservatives, pragmatists and reformists for a move to freeze the 
country‘s nuclear program, even on a temporary basis.  And as Sadjadpour has argued, 
such a move would be uncharacteristic for a conservative like Khamenei, for the reasons 
discussed earlier.  In the previous chapter, we saw how former Iranian nuclear negotiator 
Mousavian complained about the criticism he and his fellow negotiators faced when 
attempting to work out the details of an enrichment suspension that would be acceptable 
to Iran and the EU3 between 2003 and 2005.  Iran‘s former chief nuclear negotiator 
Hassan Rowhani also publicly complained about the difficulties he faced in getting Iran‘s 
leadership to back a compromise with the West.  He criticized the country‘s leadership 
for adopting after Ahmadinejad took office in 2005 what he described as an 
uncompromising approach to negotiations with the West, according to which any 
suspension of Iran‘s uranium enrichment program, even temporary, was out of the 
question.
145
  Rowhani, who was sidelined after President Ahmadinejad came to power, 
appeared to rebuke the fiery president for his confrontational approach, calling for ―more 
balance in our decisions and (the need) to approach the issue with more reason and less 
emotion.‖146  But this was not because Rowhani believed Iran should abandon its nuclear 
ambitions and give into the demands of the West.  On the contrary, he argued that Iran 
should avoid confrontation – a recommendation Ahmadinejad ignored – and temporarily 
suspend its enrichment program while quietly pushing ahead to achieve mastery over 
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nuclear technology in order to force a kind of nuclear ―fait accompli‖ on the world.  As 
Rowhani reportedly said in a 2004 speech to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council: 
I think we should not be in a great rush to deal with this issue. We should 
be patient and find the most suitable time to do away with the suspension. 
. . . We must move very carefully, in a very calculated manner.
147
 
 
Five years after Rowhani said that, Ahmadinejad himself attempted to reach a deal with 
the West on a plan that would have involved moving most of Iran‘s enriched uranium 
stocks out of the country so that it could be transformed into fresh nuclear fuel assemblies 
for a specialized medical research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).  This 
time the president himself was undercut by his political rivals in the parliament, the 
Majlis, and the deal, agreed in principle at a meeting in Geneva in 2009, collapsed.
148
 
(T)he tentative deal ran into immediate trouble in Tehran, where it was 
rejected by Ahmadinejad‘s rivals across the political spectrum. Majlis 
Speaker Ali Larijani, who as Iran‘s previous nuclear negotiator had 
repeatedly been vetoed by hardliners when he sought small elements of 
tactical flexibility, found revenge by castigating the Geneva plan as a 
Western deception.
149
 
 
Larijani‘s sharp public criticism of the deal was enough to push Khamenei to distance 
himself from the plan.  The reformist presidential candidate who opposed Ahmadinejad 
in 2009, Mir Hossein Mousavi, also spoke out against the TRR deal, along with Mohsen 
Rezai, the conservative candidate in that same election.
150
  The deal was dead shortly 
after arrival in Tehran.  It was a case that illustrated how no matter who in Iran proposes 
a compromise with the West, there is always someone to oppose it.  
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 The 125,000-strong Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as 
the Pasdaran or the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, is a key player in 
Iranian politics.  The IRGC has grown from a small militia charged with ensuring the 
ideological protection of the 1979 Islamic revolution into a major force inside Iran that 
permeates virtually every corner of Iranian society, politics and economy.
151
  
Ideologically, the IRGC is conservative, though it, like the rest of Iranian society, has its 
own factions.  Nevertheless, it is possible to make some general observations about the 
IRGC and what appears to be the low probability that its leaders would favor a 
compromise with the West over Iran‘s nuclear program.  As RAND Corporation analysts 
explained in a 2009 report, the IRGC generally seeks to keep the ideology of the Islamic 
revolution alive. 
Bound together by the shared experience of war and the socialization of 
military service, the Pasdaran have articulated a populist, authoritarian, 
and assertive vision for the Islamic Republic of Iran that they maintain is a 
more faithful reflection of the revolution‘s early ideals.152 
 
While the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is officially in charge of Iran‘s 
nuclear program, it is the IRGC that oversees the more sensitive operations.  In its last 
sanctions resolution adopted in June 2010 the U.N. Security Council explicitly noted with 
―serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
… in Iran‘s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems.‖153  According to the RAND report, the IRGC is in charge of 
Iran‘s ―unconventional warfare options‖ and would be the likely guardian of any Iranian 
nuclear arsenal, should the government acquire one: ―Were Iran to develop and field 
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nuclear weapons, oversight of their storage, training, and deployment infrastructure 
would likely fall to the IRGC.‖154 
 According to Takeyh, the principal supporters of, and driving force behind, Iran‘s 
nuclear weapons program are ―elements associated with Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenei.‖155  Those elements control important institutions like the IRGC and the 
Guardian Council, giving them significant influence over Iranian national security 
policy.
156
  They also subscribe to a world view that renders them unlikely to favor 
abandoning or suspending the nuclear project and compromising with the West because 
that would be a betrayal of the revolutionary ideals they are sworn to uphold.   
A fundamental tenet of their ideology is that the Islamic Republic is in 
constant danger from predatory external forces, necessitating military self-
reliance. This perception was initially molded by a revolution that sought 
not just to defy international norms but also to refashion them. The 
passage of time and the failure of that mission have not necessarily 
diminished widespread suspicions of the international order and its 
primary guardian, the United States.
157
 
 
Support for development of a nuclear deterrent, however, is not limited to the IRGC.  
Whether it involves developing an actual nuclear arsenal or ensuring that Iran is a 
position to construct a nuclear warhead at short notice, support for nuclear empowerment 
is spread widely across the country‘s various power centers.  There is also no dearth of 
those who support development of an actual atomic weapon among Iran‘s elite. 
You find that more within the hawkish elements of the Iranian elite. You 
will find them within the Council of Guardians; you will find them within 
the Revolutionary Guard; you will find them within the judiciary; you find 
them even within the Supreme Leader‘s office, and quite possibly, with 
the Supreme Leader himself.
158
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With the cautious Khamenei on top and conservative factions ready and willing to brand 
any move toward rapprochement with the West as a sign of weakness or a betrayal of the 
revolution, it is impossible to imagine Iran deciding to halt its nuclear program.  
Domestic pressures from multiple groups inside Iran – including public opinion – are 
such that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to get consensus within the Iranian 
leadership on abandoning or suspending the country‘s nuclear fuel program in order to 
cut a deal with the West.  And Khamenei is someone who seeks consensus wherever 
possible. 
 60 
Chapter 5 – Sanctions: An Imperfect Tool 
Since 2006, the principal tool that the United States and its European allies have 
relied on to persuade Iran to alter its nuclear policy is a combination of U.N. and 
unilateral U.S. and European sanctions,
 159
 which have clearly had a negative impact on 
Iran‘s economy and slowed the progress of Tehran‘s nuclear enrichment program.  But 
the sanctions have not produced any visible changes in Tehran‘s official nuclear policy as 
it continues to expand its enrichment program.  This is hardly surprising as sanctions 
have a poor record of persuading countries to change their behavior. A 1992 study by the 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) on the value and impact of sanctions found that 
they were somewhat effective when it came to modest goals such as ―upholding 
international norms by punishing the target nation for unacceptable behavior and 
deterring future objectionable actions.‖160  But they have been less successful with the 
more publicly prominent objective of persuading countries targeted by sanctions to 
comply with the sanctioning states‘ wishes.  The GAO also found that while sanctions 
can increase the cost of trade and financing for the sanctioned state, they generally do not 
ruin the target countries‘ economies, and can have a deleterious effect on the sanctioning 
nation by halting mutually beneficial trade.  But actual damage to a sanctioned country‘s 
economy, the GAO found, rarely corresponds to the threatened impact because countries 
learn how to evade the measures and redirect their trade and financial flows elsewhere.
161
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Having lived under sanctions for decades, Iran has become a skilled evader of 
restrictions on its trade.  It has also had help from some of its major trading partners, 
including Russia and China.  Moscow and Beijing have been at best reluctant supporters 
of the U.N. Security Council sanctions, repeatedly condemning the more draconian 
unilateral U.S. and EU measures that target Iran‘s financial and energy sectors.  Since 
2006, Russia and China worked hard to soften the U.S. and European push for U.N. 
sanctions and have made clear they oppose sanctioning Tehran‘s energy sector.  This has 
undoubtedly sent signals to Tehran that the big powers are split on the question of how 
tough they should be on Iran.  Moscow and Beijing have gone so far as to suggest that 
there is no longer any room for new U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran, further 
undermining the ability of the P5-plus-one to back up any potential offers of incentives 
with threats of punishment if Tehran continues to avoid the negotiating table.
162
  While 
the West has sharply curtailed commerce with Iran, Russia continues to cooperate with 
Tehran on developing nuclear power plants, while China remains a top purchaser of 
Iranian oil.  Iran remains open for business with Moscow and Beijing, especially the 
latter, which needs Iran‘s vast energy reserves to help fuel its own booming economy and 
increasing demand within the world‘s most populous nation.163 
There are several reasons for the fact that sanctions have failed to persuade Iran to 
abandon its nuclear program.  First of all, as discussed in previous chapters, there is the 
Iranian leadership‘s determination to acquire a nuclear deterrent for national security 
reasons.  Secondly, sanctions are most effective when applied against democratic 
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governments that face strong internal opposition, something that is not the case in Iran 
when it comes to the country‘s nuclear program.  The GAO study found that sanctions 
tend to ―work best when there is strong internal political opposition to the target 
government, particularly internationally oriented commercial interests that want to retain 
business ties with the country imposing the sanctions.‖164   Iran does not have a liberal 
democratic government and the domestic opposition has never questioned the wisdom of 
having a nuclear program, though it has sharply criticized the government of President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for what it says is his economic mismanagement.  As a result, 
there is little or no internal political pressure on the Iranian government to alter its 
nuclear policy.  A third reason why sanctions have failed to persuade Tehran to change its 
nuclear policy is that Iran has found sophisticated ways to evade sanctions, an issue I 
discuss in detail later on in this chapter.  Finally, as mentioned above, a number of 
countries, above all China, Russia, India and Turkey, have maintained a readiness to 
trade with Iran, offering it open trading channels that are often out of reach of Western 
governments. 
The Sanctions 
While Iran has been under a U.S. embargo for decades, it was not until just over 
six years ago that Tehran began facing U.N. sanctions.  In February 2006, the IAEA 
Board of Governors formally referred the case of ―Iran‘s many failures and breaches of 
its obligations to comply with its NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Safeguards 
Agreement‖ to the U.N. Security Council due to IAEA discoveries related to Iran‘s 
clandestine uranium enrichment work.
165
  In July 2006, the Security Council ordered Iran 
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to ―suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities‖ or face sanctions under 
Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.
166
  Iran ignored the council‘s ultimatum and in December 
2006 the 15-nation council unanimously voted to impose its first round of sanctions on 
Tehran.  Resolution 1737 focused on Iran's nuclear and missile industries, blacklisting the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), firms linked to Iran's atomic and missile 
programs, and a number of individuals involved in Iran‘s nuclear and missile 
industries.
167
  Under the U.N. measures, any foreign assets of blacklisted entities were to 
be frozen and the entities themselves banned from conducting any international 
transactions.  As with all U.N. Security Council decisions, enforcement and 
implementation rests in the hands of individual member states.  Therein lay one of their 
principal weaknesses. 
Resolution 1747, the second Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran, 
was adopted unanimously in March 2007.  It tightened the measures laid out in 1737 in 
several ways.  It called on all U.N. member states and international financial institutions 
"not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional 
loans" to Tehran except for humanitarian purposes.
168
  It also blacklisted Iran‘s Bank 
Sepah, banned all Iranian arms exports and expanded the U.N. blacklist of firms and 
individuals that would face an international asset freeze and travel ban. 
Resolution 1803, adopted in March 2008 with 14 votes in favor and one 
abstention (Indonesia), incrementally tightened the measures against Iran included in the 
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two previous resolutions.  It called for "vigilance" against two more Iranian banks – Bank 
Melli and Bank Saderat – but did not formally blacklist them.169  The most important new 
measure in 1803 was a call for cargo inspections of vessels operated by Iran Air Cargo 
and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as they travel in and out of Iran – 
provided there are sufficient grounds to do so.  As with the previous two resolutions, the 
measures in the final text were watered down in response to objections from Russia and 
China. 
Resolution 1929, adopted in June 2010 with 12 votes in favor, two votes against – 
Brazil and Turkey – and one abstention (Lebanon), was the toughest of the four U.N. 
Security Council sanctions resolutions.  It included a ban on the sale of eight categories 
of heavy weapons to Iran and authorized U.N. member states to inspect and seize any 
suspicious air, land or sea cargo going into or coming out of Iran, not just cargo shipped 
by IRISL or Iran Air Cargo.  It called on countries to prevent any financial services to 
Iran that could support its nuclear or missile programs and urged states "to exercise 
vigilance over all Iranian banks," including the Central Bank of Iran.  It blacklisted First 
East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat, three IRISL subsidiaries and added other 
firms and individuals to the U.N. blacklist. It demanded that countries "exercise 
vigilance" when dealing with any Iranian company.
170
  Later in this chapter we will look 
more closely at the months of negotiations that led to resolution 1929, which provided the 
legal basis for tough European Union sanctions against Iran‘s financial and energy 
sectors. 
                                                 
169
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1803 (S/RES/1803), March 3, 2008 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1803(2008)  
170
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1929 (S/RES/1929), June 9, 2010 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1929(2010)  
 65 
The United States has long had extensive sanctions in place against Iran.  In the 
decades following the 1979-81 hostage crisis, during which Washington broke off 
diplomatic relations with Tehran, the United States gradually banned the import of most 
Iranian products into the United States and made most trade with Iran illegal.  In recent 
years, the EU, long one of Iran‘s main trading partners, has gradually increased its own 
sanctions against the Islamic Republic.  In 2010, the EU banned the creation of joint 
ventures with enterprises in Iran engaged in the oil and natural gas industries.  It also 
outlawed the provision of insurance and re-insurance to the government of Iran, making it 
difficult for Iran‘s state oil shipper IRISL to insure its cargo since most re-insurers are in 
Europe, and banned the sale of energy industry equipment to Iran. Last year, the EU 
outlawed all new oil contracts with Iran and announced it would freeze any assets of the 
Central Bank of Iran in Europe.
171
  In October 2012, the EU broadened its measures to 
ban all trade with major Iranian state companies in the oil and gas industry and 
strengthened restrictions on dealings with the central bank.
172
 
―Smart‖ Sanctions 
The U.N. sanctions against Iran were never intended to cut off all trade with the 
Islamic Republic.  Their official aim is to cripple Iran‘s nuclear and missile industries 
without impacting the rest of Iran‘s economy, which would harm ordinary Iranians.  The 
application of so-called targeted sanctions that focus on specific industries and 
individuals – also known as ―smart sanctions‖ – has become the norm in the wake of the 
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sweeping trade embargo against Iraq in the 1990s, which was heavily criticized by human 
rights groups due to the impact it had on the civilian population.  It is difficult to quantify 
precisely what impact the sanctions had on Iraqi civilians, but it was clearly severe.  It is 
estimated that hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths could be attributed to the U.N. 
sanctions over the years they were in place. 
By 1998 Iraqi infant mortality had reportedly risen from the pre-Gulf War 
rate of 3.7 percent to 12 percent. Inadequate food and medical supplies, as 
well as breakdowns in sewage and sanitation systems and in the electrical 
power systems needed to run them, reportedly caused an increase of 
40,000 deaths annually of children under the age of 5 and of 50,000 deaths 
annually of older Iraqis.
173
 
 
Concerns about the humanitarian impact of the Iraq sanctions led to the establishment in 
1996 of the so-called Oil-for-Food program.  Overseen by the United Nations, Oil-for-
Food allowed Iraq to resume the export of oil to purchase humanitarian items such as 
food and medicines.  But the program became a conduit for kickbacks and bribes and is 
now considered a good example of how not to manage sanctions.
174
 
 While sanctions did not lead to a collapse of Saddam Hussein‘s regime, U.N. 
weapons inspectors who returned to Iraq in 2002 after a four-year hiatus found no 
evidence that Baghdad had revived its previously discovered nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons programs.  Clearly the sanctions, combined with the constant threat 
of military intervention by the United States, played some role in the government‘s 
decision not to revive those weapons programs, which it was forbidden by the U.N. 
Security Council from pursuing.  False allegations by the United States and Britain in 
2002 and 2003 about the revival of those banned arms programs helped to justify the 
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U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider 
the impact of the Iraq sanctions on the Iraqi government‘s policymaking calculus.  
Suffice it to say that it is possible the combination of the U.N. sanctions, the military 
threat, and a highly intrusive U.N. inspection regime during the years 1991-98 and 2002-
03 may have achieved one of their main objectives – to persuade Iraq to abandon its 
banned weapons programs – albeit at a massive cost to the civilian population in terms of 
lives and public health.  As is often the case with sanctions, top-ranking officials in the 
Iraqi regime suffered little. 
 Humanitarian Impact of the Sanctions on Iran 
 Western governments that have lobbied for sanctions against Iran have repeatedly 
said over the years that the point of their measures is not to punish the general Iranian 
population but to persuade the government to change its nuclear policy and accept a 
negotiated settlement with the P5-plus-one that would include suspending Tehran‘s 
uranium enrichment program.  The EU reiterated that point when it announced a new 
round of sanctions measures against Iran in October 2012. 
Today's decisions target Iran's nuclear and ballistic programmes and the 
revenues of the Iranian government for these programmes. They are meant 
to persuade Iran to engage constructively by negotiating seriously and 
addressing the concerns of the international community. The sanctions are 
not aimed at the Iranian people.
175
 
 
While the intention of the sanctions may not have been to hurt the Iranian population, 
there is strong evidence that the cumulative effect of six years of increasingly strict U.N., 
EU and U.S. sanctions is extremely negative for ordinary Iranians.  According to a report 
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by the office of U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, international sanctions on Iran are 
hurting the Iranian population and harming humanitarian operations in the country. 
The sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran have had 
significant effects on the general population, including an escalation in 
inflation, a rise in commodities and energy costs, an increase in the rate of 
unemployment and a shortage of necessary items, including medicine.
176
 
 
The value of the Iranian currency, the rial, has plummeted over the past year.  In late 
September and early October 2012 it lost a third of its value over a 10-day period, 
sparking street protests.  U.S. and other Western officials have blamed the currency‘s 
collapse on a combination of economic mismanagement and the sanctions.
177
   
The U.N. report attributes many of Iran‘s economic troubles to the sanctions.  One 
of the side effects U.N., U.S. and EU sanctions is that it has become difficult for foreign 
companies to finance legal trade with Iran, since international banks are increasingly 
worried about doing any business with Iran.  The report said "even companies that have 
obtained the requisite license to import food and medicine are facing difficulties in 
finding third-country banks to process the transactions.‖178   Payment problems have 
prompted pharmaceutical companies to stop exporting medicines to Iran, leading to 
shortages of drugs used to treat cancer, heart and respiratory conditions, multiple 
sclerosis and other illnesses.  The report also warned U.N. member states that Iranian 
humanitarian aid groups and activists have voiced concerns about the combined effects of 
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the sanctions, rising inflation, and soaring commodity prices, which are having "far-
reaching effects on the general population."
179
 
Foreign trade data for the EU and Iran through 2011 did not point to a significant 
overall decline in EU-Iranian transactions, though those figures date from before the 
rapid deterioration of the Iranian economy in 2012.  It also remains to be seen what 
impact the latest steps taken by Brussels will have on future EU-Iran trade.  While the 
bloc‘s total trade with Iran dropped from 27 billion euros in 2008 to just under 20 billion 
euros in 2009, it shot back up to 25.8 billion euros in 2010, falling back to 23.8 billion 
euros in 2011.  EU figures also show that the 27-nation bloc was Iran‘s number one 
trading partner in 2010 and 2011 for combined imports and exports, followed by United 
Arab Emirates, China, India and Japan.
180
  In light of the bloc‘s increasing restrictions on 
EU-Iran trade, it unlikely that the EU retained its position as Iran‘s top trading partner in 
2012.  U.S. trade with Iran is insignificant compared with Europe‘s, though it has 
continued to grow despite the extensive U.S. and U.N. sanctions in place against Tehran.  
In the first eight months of 2012, America‘s trade with Iran increased to $199.5 million 
from $150.8 million a year earlier, much of that due to grain sales, which are permissible 
under U.S. law, according to U.S. Census Bureau data.
181
 
Cat and Mouse Games: Evading Sanctions 
Although they have not halted it, there are signs that the international sanctions 
against Iran have had an impact on the government‘s ability to push ahead with its 
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nuclear program.  A 2012 report by the U.N. Security Council‘s Panel of Experts, a group 
of independent monitors who assess compliance with the U.N. sanctions regime, 
concluded that the U.N. sanctions have hampered Iran‘s ability to develop its nuclear fuel 
program. 
Sanctions are slowing the procurement by the Islamic Republic of Iran of 
some critical items required for its prohibited nuclear programme. At the 
same time, prohibited activities, including uranium enrichment, are 
continuing.
182
 
 
That report also highlighted some of the difficulties in implementing targeted sanctions 
against a country like Iran, which has been under some form of sanctions for more than 
three decades and, as a result, has become highly skilled at evading trade restrictions.  
One case that the U.N. Panel of Experts‘ report describes in detail is that of the state-
owned Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Iran‘s principal maritime 
shipping firm.  At the time the experts‘ report was completed in April 2012, IRISL had 
more than 130 vessels operated by a sprawling network of some 75 companies, the 
majority of which operated only one or two vessels each.  The panel said that such 
practices were unusual for a large shipping firm and made it difficult for international 
observers to keep track of what IRISL‘s ships were up to.183 
These activities, although not in themselves illegal, have introduced a 
complex and amorphous structure to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines that serves to obscure its activities as a whole and the identities of 
individual vessels. The more complex the overall structure of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, the more difficult and time-consuming 
the identification of ships related to it.
184
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The first reference to IRISL in a Security Council resolution was in 1803, adopted in 
March 2008, which called on countries to inspect the company‘s vessels if there were 
reasonable grounds to suspect it might be carrying banned cargo.  At that time, IRISL 
owned more than 110 vessels, according to the Panel of Experts.  After the resolution 
passed, IRISL began transferring its ships to two companies linked to the parent firm, the 
Hafiz Darya Shipping Company and Sapid Shipping Company.  Between 2008 and June 
2010, IRISL carried out a further 110 changes of ownership of its vessels.  By April 
2012, IRISL owned 50 vessels, 14 of which it owned directly and another 36 of which 
were owned by 14 different shell companies linked to IRISL.  This murky ownership 
structure has made it difficult to track IRISL ships since tens of thousands of vessels are 
on the sea at any given moment around the world.
185
 
Another of IRISL‘s obfuscation methods has been the constant renaming of 
vessels, making certain that the ships‘ new names contain nothing that directly associates 
them with Iran.  In 2008, most of IRISL‘s vessels contained the word ―Iran.‖   By April 
2012 fewer than 10 of IRISL‘s more than 130 ships contained the word ―Iran‖ in their 
names.  Since March 2008, there have been more than 150 changes of the names of ships 
that were at some point registered to IRISL, Hafiz Darya and Sapid.  In addition to 
altering the ships names, there have been more than 90 changes in the flag states of 
IRISL‘s vessels, adding yet another layer of obfuscation.186  The U.N. Panel of Experts 
notes that the complicated shell game the company is using to hide its ships make it 
extremely difficult for national maritime authorities around the world to track the 
movements of IRISL-linked vessels and fulfill their legal obligations to inspect 
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suspicious Iranian cargo and seize sanctioned items.  The Panel concluded that ―vigilance 
over the company‘s activities, in particular monitoring vessels‘ International Maritime 
Organization numbers, continues to be important.‖187 
Financial Troubles 
Financial authorities in the United States and EU member states have exerted a 
great deal of effort to make it difficult for Iran to access international financial markets.  
During negotiations on the fourth U.N. sanctions resolution against Iran – resolution 1929 
from June 2010 – the United States, Britain and France had attempted to persuade Russia 
and China to blacklist Iran‘s central bank but Moscow and China, which maintain close 
business ties with Tehran, rejected the proposal.
188
  Sanctioning the central bank, they 
argued, would have made it nearly impossible to conduct legitimate trade with Iran, since 
all foreign transactions are, as a ruled, cleared through a country‘s central bank.  While it 
only blacklisted one more Iranian bank, resolution 1929 included language calling for 
vigilance regarding all Iranian banks, including the central bank.  Western nations have 
used this call for vigilance as the legal basis for a de facto blacklisting of Iran‘s central 
bank and most Iranian financial institutions.  As a result, any transaction with an Iranian 
bank, legal or not, is risky business for anyone hoping to avoid running afoul of U.S. or 
European authorities. 
The remainder of this section is based on an extensive interview in November 
2012 with a Western Security Council diplomat based in New York who ran the 
negotiations for one of the P5-plus-one delegations six months over the course of six 
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months until resolution 1929 was adopted in June 2010.  The diplomat requested that his 
name and home country be withheld since he was not authorized to speak publicly about 
the negotiating process. 
Within the Western camp, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice 
insisted on being the ―pen-holder‖ for the draft resolution, which was to become the 
fourth U.N. sanctions package.  French Ambassador Gerard Araud and his British 
counterpart Mark Lyall Grant were reluctant to allow Rice to draft the resolution.  The 
Europeans had drafted the three previous U.N. sanctions resolutions and both Araud and 
Lyall Grant had long years of experience negotiating on the Iran issue, since they had 
been political directors for their respective foreign ministries.  As a result, they were 
closely involved in negotiations on some of the earlier sanctions resolutions.  There were 
no concerns about Rice‘s competence but British and French diplomats were worried that 
Obama‘s desire to keep open the possibility of negotiations with Iran – something he had 
offered Tehran shortly after taking office in early 2009 – would lead Washington to 
present an initial draft that would be too soft. 
―Your first draft has to be the strongest,‖ the Security Council diplomat said. ―The 
process of negotiating (on Iran sanctions) means the gradual removal of sanctions 
measures to please the Russians and Chinese.  So if you set the bar too low, you‘ve got 
nowhere to go.  You have to aim high.‖  The Europeans reluctantly agreed to let Rice be 
the pen-holder – or drafter – of the resolution.  They were pleasantly surprised.  The U.S. 
proposed elements for a sanctions resolution that included blacklisting the Central Bank 
of Iran and other banks and trading companies.  It also targeted the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC), shipping and other firms and called for authorizing countries to 
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board ships and seize suspicious cargo from all land, air and sea vessels coming in and 
out of Iran, provided there was suspicion that banned materials  were on board.  It did not 
target Iran‘s oil and gas sectors, something the French had wanted. 
In the course of the negotiations, the idea of blacklisting the central bank was 
dropped due to Russian and Chinese opposition, though language was kept that would 
urge U.N. member states to ―exercise vigilance‖ regarding the central bank and all other 
Iranian financial institutions.  Since it was clear that China, a major energy customer of 
Iran‘s, was fighting the Western negotiators on blacklisting banks, the call for vigilance 
on Iranian banks was especially important. U.S. and European negotiators knew that this 
wording would later give the EU the legal basis to blacklist virtually all Iranian banks 
once the resolution was adopted. 
―That was clearly the strategy. We didn‘t talk about it but the Russians knew 
exactly what we were doing,‖ the diplomat said. ―The idea was to give us language that 
would enable us to act on our own when implementing the U.N. sanctions, (action) that 
goes well beyond what‘s explicitly in the text. We‘ve done that with banks and other 
Iranian industries.‖  For their part, the Russians tried to include language barring 
―unilateral‖ coercive measures – a strategy clearly aimed at the United States and 
European Union – but the U.S. and European delegations resisted. Russia also wanted to 
include language making it clear that there should no ―extraterritorial‖ enforcement of 
any unilateral sanctions. The U.S. and European negotiators rejected that as well.  I will 
discuss Washington‘s drive for extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 
detail later in this chapter. 
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Negotiations on the new sanctions resolution continued within the P5-plus-one 
throughout much of early 2010.  The 10 non-permanent Security Council members, 
including Turkey and Brazil, complained about being left out of discussions on a draft 
resolution they would eventually be asked to vote for.  The political dynamics on the 
council were growing tense.  Lebanon made clear that it would be unable to support any 
sanctions resolution against Iran, given that the Iranian-backed Hezbollah movement was 
sharing power in Beirut with a Western-backed political bloc led by Saad al-Hariri, son 
of assassinated Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, and would have difficulty reaching a 
consensus.  Brazil, an important developing power with increasing clout inside the Group 
of 20 club of key developed and developing nations, and Turkey also made clear they 
disliked the idea of sanctioning Iran again. 
In the spring of 2010, Turkey and Brazil attempted to resurrect the defunct Tehran 
Research Reactor nuclear-fuel-swap deal that had fallen apart in late 2009, as discussed 
in previous chapters. This infuriated the Russians, who saw it as a Turkish and Brazilian 
attempt to infiltrate the P5-plus-one and undermine the authority of the P5 (Brazil sees 
itself as a candidate for a permanent seat on an expanded Security Council if an 
agreement on that divisive issue can ever be reached.)  That was when Russia made clear 
it was in agreement with a U.N. Security Council sanctions package, provided agreement 
could be reached on specific measures that did not cross Russia‘s red lines, along with a 
list of entities to be added to the existing U.N. blacklist. Moscow wanted to keep the 
focus on Iran‘s nuclear and missile programs, while avoiding the financial and energy 
sectors. But it signaled it was open to the idea of sanctioning shipping firms and the 
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IRGC.  As the Security Council diplomat explained: ―Russia doesn‘t like it when 
countries try to take power away from the P5.‖ 
 On May 17, 2012, Iran, Brazil and Turkey issued a joint communiqué called the 
Tehran Declaration.
189
 In it, they pledged to revive the fuel-swap deal that the Iranians 
had earlier agreed to with the United States, France, Russia and the IAEA but later 
wavered on implementing.  The day after the declaration was signed, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that agreement had been 
reached on a new draft U.N. sanctions resolution against Iran among the five permanent 
Security Council members and Germany and would be circulated to the remaining 10 
council members later that day.  Brazil and Turkey were furious about what they saw as 
Clinton‘s response to the Tehran Declaration, which the Brazilians and Turks had wanted 
to use as the basis for a process that would render further U.N. sanctions unnecessary.  
But the Americans and Europeans were determined to press ahead with the dual-track 
approach of sanctions in addition to engagement, and Russia and China made no attempt 
to stop them.  This rendered the Brazilian and Turkish efforts irrelevant. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Turkish and Brazilian votes in the Security Council 
may have been irrevocably lost when Clinton announced that the U.S. response to the 
Tehran Declaration was to circulate a draft sanctions resolution.  The result was the 
lowest number of ‗yes‘ votes for a U.N. sanctions resolution against Iran – the first two in 
2006 and 2007 were approved unanimously, while the third in 2008 passed with 14 yes 
votes and one abstention from Indonesia.  Resolution 1929 was adopted on June 9, 2010 
with only 12 votes in favor, two votes against from Turkey and Brazil, and one abstention 
from Lebanon.  Lebanon‘s abstention came after the Lebanese cabinet failed to reach a 
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decision, due to a 50-50 split between Hezbollah ministers who opposed it and non-
Hezbollah cabinet members who were in favor.
190
 
Looking back at the effectiveness of resolution 1929, the Security Council 
diplomat said it has been much more effective than they had foreseen while negotiating it 
in early 2010. It was also extremely important for the EU, which has used it as a legal 
springboard to impose a variety of tough unilateral sanctions on banks, shipping and 
other firms – and Iran‘s energy sector, which Russia and China say should never be 
subject to U.N. sanctions.  With the aid of resolution 1929, the EU was able to take steps 
that went beyond the U.N. sanctions while doing so in the name of implementing the 
U.N. measures.  According to the Security Council diplomat, this was one of the goals of 
the Western negotiators when they were drafting the sanctions – creating a legal basis for 
additional unilateral EU and U.S. sanctions.  For example, the United States, Britain and 
France persuaded Russia and China to allow the following language in resolution 1929 
which offered the EU a legal basis for sanctioning Iran‘s energy sector: "Noting the 
potential connection between Iran‘s revenues derived from its energy sector and the 
funding of Iran‘s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and further noting that 
chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have 
much in common with those  required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle 
activities."
191
  The Russians were not comfortable with the idea that 1929 would enable 
Western governments to take further unilateral measures against Iran, the diplomat said, 
but in the end they acquiesced. 
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In the final days before 1929 was passed, Russia and the rest of the council had 
effectively signed off on the resolution, and the final negotiations were between Rice and 
Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong. China was opposed to the inclusion of a number banks 
on the new blacklist.  In the end, only one bank was added to the U.N. blacklist, First 
East Export Bank, a subsidiary of Bank Mellat based in Malaysia, but Beijing agreed to 
support the addition of 40 new Iranian entities to the U.N. sanctions list. 
The U.S. and European delegations tried hard to secure a full blacklisting of 
Iranian shipping firm IRISL but failed to persuade Russia and China. In the end, they 
compromised with Moscow and Beijing by designating three IRISL subsidiaries – Irano 
Hind Shipping Company, IRISL Benelux NV and South Shipping Line Iran (SSL).  The 
idea of designating subsidiaries of larger companies was part of a broader strategy. ―By 
designating subsidiaries, you draw a red flag to the parent company,‖ the European 
diplomat said. ―Then the EU and U.S. can come along and designate the parent company. 
It‘s not ideal, but you have to work with the political realities you‘re faced with.  It‘s 
symbolic in a way, but it has an impact.‖ 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there are increasing concerns at the United 
Nations about the impact of the sanctions on ordinary Iranians. The Western powers had 
originally intended the measures to be targeted, aimed solely at the nuclear and missile 
industries.  While the Iran sanctions regime continues to suffer from patchy 
implementation, U.N. officials and sanctions experts say its stranglehold on Iran is 
tightening and the cumulative effect of the measures has clearly impacted the Iranian 
population.  The Security Council diplomat acknowledged this, summing up situation as 
follows: ―It‘s not Iraq – at least not yet.‖  
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Extraterritorial Enforcement 
The U.S. government has been particularly aggressive in pushing foreign banks 
and other companies to avoid any business with Iranian firms, threatening them with U.S. 
sanctions if they fail to heed Washington‘s warnings.  The United States has made clear 
that foreign companies failing to comply with U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran could 
find themselves cut off from U.S. markets.  The extraterritorial enforcement of unilateral 
U.S. sanctions has forced countries like Turkey and India, which are major purchasers of 
Iranian oil, to seek alternative oil suppliers or non-monetary methods of payment.
192
  
New U.S. measures announced last year are intended to cut off Tehran‘s oil revenues by 
preventing financial institutions from carrying out oil transactions with the Central Bank 
of Iran, which handles most of Iran‘s oil payments. As the U.S. Treasury Department has 
made clear to countries around the world, the point of the new U.S. measures is to force 
countries to significantly reduce oil imports from Iran to avoid their banks being banished 
from U.S. markets.
193
  The United States has demonstrated its willingness to sanction 
Russian and Chinese companies that continue to do business with Iran in defiance of U.S. 
sanctions.  Beijing protested to Washington last year after the Treasury sanctioned Bank 
of Kunlun, a unit of the state-owned China National Petroleum Corp., for its involvement 
in Iran‘s energy sector.194  In December 2012, Washington warned Russia that activities 
of a U.S.-sanctioned Iranian bank in Russia, Mir Business Bank CJSC, could lead U.S. 
authorities to increase their scrutiny of Russian banks active in the United States, a thinly 
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veiled threat typical of Washington‘s drive to enforce American sanctions 
extraterritorially.
195
  The United States has, however, been willing to grant sanctions 
waivers to countries that can prove they have reduced their reliance on Iranian oil.  
Countries that have sought such waivers include India, Turkey, South Korea and 
China.
196
   
 Some countries, like Iran‘s neighbor Turkey, have openly declared that they will 
only comply with U.N. sanctions and do not see themselves bound by unilateral U.S. 
restrictions.  By way of comparison, the Security Council has only blacklisted three 
Iranian banks while the United States has designated well over a dozen.
197
  But U.S. 
officials have made clear to governments and companies with strong commercial ties to 
Iran that Washington considers all firms that do business with the United States obligated 
to comply with U.S. sanctions against Iran, regardless of those countries‘ legal codes.  In 
the case of Turkey, the United States sent a delegation of Treasury Department officials 
to Ankara in 2010 to explain to Turkish officials what the United States expected of 
them.
198
  According to U.S. and other Western financial intelligence officials, Turkey was 
―allowing itself to be used as a conduit for Iranian activity via Turkish banks and the 
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Turkish lira, making it possible for Iranian funds in Turkish guise to make their way into 
Europe.‖199   
Two years after the Treasury Department delegation visited Ankara, Turkish 
banks are more cautious about doing business with Iran.
200
  But they have not cut off 
commercial ties.  More recently Turkey has been annoying U.S. authorities by selling 
significant quantities of gold to Iran, a precious commodity that Washington fears could 
help it continue to evade sanctions.  By bartering for items with gold, Iran can bypass 
international financial markets, which usually require payments in dollars, euros or other 
currencies Iran now has difficulty accessing.  Turkish gold sales to Iran increased sharply 
in March 2012, just as Iran was expelled from the international financial settlement 
network SWIFT.
201
  The difficulties the United States has had persuading Turkey to 
comply with unilateral U.S. sanctions illustrates the problem of enforcing punitive 
measures when key trading partners of a sanctioned country do not feel legally bound by 
them. 
 Russia has also continued to engage in large-scale business projects with Iran, as 
exemplified by the Russian-built Bushehr light-water nuclear power plant.  While U.N. 
sanctions did not explicitly bar Russia from completing the Bushehr project, which was 
underway well before the first U.N. sanctions resolution against Iran was adopted in 
2006, Moscow ran into difficulties with the EU over the plant.  In 2010, German 
authorities seized nuclear-related items purchased in Germany that were en route to the 
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Bushehr plant and detained several men involved in the transaction for questioning.  
Russian U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin complained to the Security Council about 
extraterritorial enforcement of the EU ban on nuclear technology transfers to Iran, 
describing it as unacceptable.
202
 
Banks in China, Iran‘s top oil export destination, have created barter 
arrangements with Tehran so that they can continue to do business there.  Rather than 
paying Iran in cash for oil purchases, Chinese banks use the funds to acquire goods for 
Iranian customers and transfer those goods to Iran.
203
  According to the U.N. Panel of 
Experts report on Iran, barter transactions with Tehran have become increasingly popular 
as Iranians find it difficult to carry out routine international transactions in U.S. dollars, 
euros and other major currencies due to the U.S. and EU restrictions.
204
  Iran has 
reportedly been offering gold bullion stored abroad, or tanker loads of oil, in exchange 
for food due to the difficulties it faces in conducting international financial 
transactions.
205
  Countries that have announced plans to increase barter trade with Iran 
include Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand.  There is no way to quantify the cost Iran 
incurs as it carries out of such elaborate countermeasures, but it undoubtedly adds to the 
financial pressure on Tehran at a time when its economy is in shambles. 
While it is difficult to say to what degree the sanctions are to blame for Iran‘s 
economic troubles, and to what extent the government‘s own economic policies are 
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responsible, there is increasing evidence that the sanctions are playing a central role.  The 
Washington-based Institute for International Finance (IIF) recently concluded that it is 
the sanctions that have pushed Iran into a deep recession.  In its latest report on the 
Middle East and North Africa, the IIF said crude oil exports from Iran plummeted in 
2012, while inflation soared.  It predicted that Iranian gross domestic product would 
likely contract by 3.5 percent in 2012, compared to 1.2 percent growth in 2011.  The 
institute also forecast that government revenues from oil sales, which accounted for half 
its income last year, could drop by at least 40 percent in the 2012-13 fiscal year.
206
  The 
IIF‘s forecasts contrasted sharply with the most recent predictions of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which said that Iran was expected to bring its high inflation down 
and return to growth next year despite the sanctions.  Unlike the IIF‘s forecasts, which 
are not based on Iranian government figures but come from independent analysis, the 
IMF predictions were largely based on official Iranian government data.
207
 
Political Fallout of Sanctions  
There are also political consequences of sanctions.  Iran‘s relations with China 
have deepened in recent years, partly due to Beijing‘s reluctance to support the sanctions 
regime and its determination to maintain strong commercial ties with Tehran.  Iran is 
increasingly looking to China, which supported all four rounds of U.N. sanctions against 
Tehran but worked hard to dilute them in negotiations on the draft resolutions, as a 
diplomatic protector and commercial ally.  China has made clear its opposition to the 
unilateral U.S. and EU sanctions against Tehran and has repeatedly said it sees no need 
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for further U.N. measures.  A March 2012 report by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) outlined how Sino-Iranian ties have been strengthening as 
the sanctions against Tehran have become increasingly stringent.
208
  The report 
concluded that Iran provides China with a secure source of oil, an arms market, a 
strategic link to the Middle East, and an indirect means of challenging American 
hegemony. 
Iran‘s need of a great power patron is satisfied by China who provides 
economic partnership, an important arms nexus, and perhaps most 
importantly diplomatic cover. The Sino-Iranian bond is strengthened by a 
mutual distrust of America‘s global reach and both nations frequently 
criticize the U.S. policy of liberal interventionism as imperialist and 
hegemonic.
209
 
 
As the United States and Europe continue to tighten their sanctions stranglehold on Iran, 
it will likely drift further into the arms of China.  That will further weaken Western 
powers‘ leverage over Tehran and dull the impact of the sanctions.  If that is the case, 
stricter U.S. and European sanctions could make Iran less likely to compromise on its 
nuclear program, because the Western measures themselves will simply encourage 
Tehran to continue turning to the east to find alternative markets to replace those in the 
West it has been shut out of.  If it is successful in its shift to the east, the sanctions on Iran 
will become increasingly less relevant as time goes on. 
The situation with Russia is slightly different.  While Russian commercial links to 
Iran remain strong, they are not as deep as China‘s, largely because Russia has its own 
ample reserves of oil and gas.  But the CSIS report concludes that Moscow, like Beijing, 
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has sought to derive political benefits from the fact that it is at best a half-hearted 
participant in enforcing sanctions against Iran, sometimes backing the U.S. position, 
sometimes opposing it.  Moscow has long-term strategic reasons for maintaining close 
ties to Iran.  
Russian calculations are decidedly realist and its policies towards each 
side (U.S. and Iran) fluctuate according to the relative risks and benefits of 
association. Russo-Iranian relations are driven by Russia‘s goals to 
establish trade and transport links to the Gulf, to coordinate oil and gas 
export policies, and to counter U.S. influence in the Middle East.
210
 
 
In short, China and Russia are resisting U.S. and European efforts to ratchet up the 
pressure on Tehran.  Rather, they continue to play both sides off against each other and 
reap whatever benefits they can from maintaining good commercial ties with Iran.  
Tehran‘s strong business ties to countries like Turkey, India, China, Russia and others 
will ensure that it has avenues to evade sanctions, limiting their effectiveness and 
demonstrating to the world that the international community is divided. 
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Chapter 6 – Getting Tough: The Military Option vs. Diplomacy 
For the last decade, hawks and doves in the United States and Israel have debated 
whether there is a realistic back-up plan involving force in the event the P5-plus-one 
process fails – in other words, a viable military option that would involve destroying or 
significantly damaging Iran‘s nuclear program without creating more problems than it 
solves.  For years, Israeli officials, some of whom have described Iran‘s nuclear program 
as an existential threat to Israel,
211
 have repeatedly declared that failure to resolve the 
diplomatic standoff with Iran at the negotiating table could prompt Israel to use military 
force to destroy Iran‘s nuclear installations212 as it did in Iraq in 1981 and in Syria in 
2007.
213
  In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2012, Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu displayed a cartoon-like diagram of a bomb to illustrate 
the progress of Iran‘s nuclear weapons program and warned those present – the Iranian 
delegation had left the assembly hall – that Israel might have no choice to but to attack 
Iran if it crossed Israel‘s ―red line,‖ which he said was the production of enough 20 
percent enriched uranium for a single bomb if it was enriched further to a weapons-grade 
level.
214
  Nor has Washington ruled out the use of force against Iran.  Two days before 
Netanyahu announced his red line, President Obama told the 193-nation General 
Assembly that the United States will ―do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a 
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nuclear weapon."
215
  Unlike the Israeli prime minister, Obama did not lay down any 
specific red lines or elaborate on his threat.
216
  But Obama‘s suggestion that the United 
States was prepared to use military force against Iran was unambiguous: ―A nuclear-
armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained.‖217 
How viable is the military option for dealing with Iran‘s nuclear program?  
According to Matthew Kroenig, a former special adviser to the U.S. Secretary of Defense 
under Obama, it is not only a viable option, it is high time the United States – not Israel, 
which lacks the military capabilities of the U.S. armed forces – used military force to 
eradicate the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.
218
  Kroenig argues that those who oppose the 
use of force, or are skeptical about it, underestimate the threat a nuclear-armed Iran 
would pose to the United States and its interests in the Middle East and elsewhere.  They 
assume that the consequences of a military attack on Iran would be as bad or worse than 
living with a nuclear Iran.  Kroenig dismisses that view. 
(T)hat is a faulty assumption. The truth is that a military strike intended to 
destroy Iran‘s nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the 
region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-
term national security of the United States.
219
 
 
He argues that a properly executed U.S. attack on Iran‘s nuclear facilities, which would 
require the deployment of bunker-busting bombs to penetrate Iran‘s underground 
facilities, would be far less risky than a decades-long attempt to contain a nuclear-armed 
Tehran.  And Iran‘s ―rapid‖ nuclear development means that the United States will 
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inevitably face a stark choice between a conventional military conflict in the shorter term 
and nuclear war in the future.
220
   
Faced with that decision, the United States should conduct a surgical strike 
on Iran‘s nuclear facilities, absorb an inevitable round of retaliation, and 
then seek to quickly de-escalate the crisis. Addressing the threat now will 
spare the United States from confronting a far more dangerous situation in 
the future.
221
 
 
 Not all analysts are as confident as Kroenig that Iran‘s nuclear program could be 
neutralized or set back significantly with the aid of air strikes.  In 2004, the Atlantic 
Monthly had retired U.S. Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner, a military strategy expert who 
has taught at the National War College and other U.S. military academies, prepare a war 
game to simulate an attack on Iran‘s nuclear facilities.  At the end of that exercise, 
Gardiner concluded that a military attack was not worth it: "After all this effort, I am left 
with two simple sentences for policymakers," he was quoted by the Atlantic as saying.  
"You have no military solution for the issues of Iran. And you have to make diplomacy 
work."
222
  One of the major drawbacks of the military option, Gardiner said, is that the 
scarcity of solid intelligence means it would be difficult to assess the actual impact of any 
bombing raids on Iran‘s nuclear program. 
Pre-emption is only a tactic that puts off the nuclear development ... It 
cannot make it go away. Since our intelligence is so limited, we won't 
even know what we achieved after an attack. If we set it back a year, what 
do we do a year later? A pre-emptive strike would carry low military risk 
but high strategic risk.
223
 
 
Two years later Gardiner spoke in Berlin about how an operation against Iran‘s nuclear 
facilities would work in theory.  He said it was theoretically feasible and would take no 
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more than five days, but would not eradicate Iran's nuclear program since the know-how 
would remain, making such an operation all but useless.
224
 
One could argue that nine years after the Atlantic war game, the United States 
should have better intelligence on Iran‘s nuclear program and be in a better position to 
assess the impact of military action on Iran‘s nuclear installations.  But intelligence on 
Iran still has its limits.  Obama said last year that the U.S. intelligence community has a 
―very good estimate‖ of how long Iran would need to develop a nuclear weapon if it 
chose to do so, though he acknowledged there was still a great deal Washington does not 
know about what is going on inside the Islamic Republic, above all regarding decision-
making.
225
  
"Do we know all of the dynamics inside of Iran? Absolutely not," Obama 
said. "Iran itself is a lot more divided now than it was. Knowing who is 
making decisions at any given time inside of Iran is tough."
 226
 
 
According to a Heritage Foundation research report, a military operation against Iran‘s 
nuclear installations would be much more complicated than the five-day campaign 
Gardiner described above – and much more difficult than Israel‘s attacks on Iraq and 
Syria – probably involving thousands of sorties over the course of several weeks.227  And, 
as Gardiner and others have said, even if such an operation was successful, it could only 
delay Iran‘s nuclear arms program, not eradicate it.  Not only is there no ironclad 
guarantee that Israeli, U.S. or European intelligence agencies know where all of Iran‘s 
nuclear facilities are located, Iran has a large number of educated scientists and 
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technicians with a sophisticated level of technical expertise.
228
  Know-how cannot be 
bombed away.  That is also the view of former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral 
Mullen, who said in 2010 that military force cannot destroy Iran‘s nuclear program, and 
the only way to deal with it is through negotiations aimed at making Tehran realize that 
the benefits of not developing nuclear bombs outweigh the benefits of having them.
229
 
 Some analysts have argued in another direction – that a limited operation focusing 
solely on Iranian nuclear facilities would be insufficient and the ultimate goal should not 
be limited to demolishing nuclear installations while sparing the country‘s leadership.  
The objective should be regime change.  Responding to Kroenig‘s article, Jamie M. Fly 
of the Foreign Policy Initiative and Gary Schmitt of the American Enterprise Institute 
agreed with some of the opponents of a targeted military action against Iranian nuclear 
facilities, describing the idea as a ―temporary fix‖ that would only force the country‘s 
leadership to move its secretive nuclear program even further underground.
230
  They also 
agree with critics of Kroenig that the nuclear know-how inside Iran is at such a high level 
that bombing its atomic facilities would not resolve the problem.  Fly‘s and Schmitt‘s 
solution, however, is not to avoid military action, but a broader operation aimed at 
undermining the Islamic government that has been in power since 1979 and hopefully 
contributing to its downfall. 
If the United States seriously considers military action, it would be better 
to plan an operation that not only strikes the nuclear program but aims to 
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destabilize the regime, potentially resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis once 
and for all.
231
 
 
Such a campaign would involve targeting key installations of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps – which the authors incorrectly refer to as the ―Republican Guard‖ – the 
intelligence ministry and other significant government facilities.   
The goal would be to compromise severely the government's ability to 
control the Iranian population. This would require an extended campaign, 
but since even a limited strike would take days and Iran would strike back, 
it would be far better to design a military operation that has a greater 
chance of producing a satisfactory outcome.
232
 
 
Fly and Schmitt acknowledge that such an operation would offer no guarantees that the 
Iranian regime would fall immediately, though it would likely increase the government‘s 
unpopularity.  The authors dismiss the idea that an outside attack on Iran would 
encourage ordinary Iranians who dislike their government to rally behind the country‘s 
leadership, a typical reaction in a time of war. 
In fact, given the unpopularity of the government, it seems more likely 
that the population would see the regime's inability to forestall the attacks 
as evidence that the emperor has no clothes and is leading the country into 
needlessly desperate straits. If anything, Iranian nationalism and pride 
would stoke even more anger at the current regime.
233
 
 
Fly and Schmitt conclude that Kroenig is correct to argue that the military option should 
be given priority at the moment.  However, they argue that half measures should be 
avoided.  If a military option is chosen ―it would be far better to put the regime at risk 
than to leave it wounded but still nuclear capable and ready to fight another day.‖234 
Colin H. Kahl of Georgetown University countered by arguing that the biggest 
problem with calls for prioritizing military action is the idea that the best approach to 
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dealing with Iran is to launch another pre-emptive war.  If there is any lesson to be 
learned from the mistakes of the Iraq war, it is that ―Washington should not choose war 
when there are still other options, and it should not base its decision to attack on best-case 
analyses of how it hopes the conflict will turn out.‖235   
He also disputes Kroenig‘s suggestion that a war with Iran would be a clean and 
manageable conflict in which Washington could avoid an uncontrollable escalation.  Kahl 
calls this a ―mirage‖ and warns that ―any war with Iran would be a messy and 
extraordinarily violent affair, with significant casualties and consequences.‖236  Iran 
would have every reason to escalate the conflict and unleash a furious retaliation against 
Israel, the United States and other countries.
237
  One of the biggest concerns in the United 
States and Europe is that Iran would blockade the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world‘s 
most important oil shipping lanes, driving up the price of crude at a time of economic 
uncertainty in Europe and the U.S.
238
  Some analysts doubt that Iran would close 
Hormuz, through which nearly 20 percent of the world‘s oil passes.  Others suggest it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for Iran to do so.  Bradley S. Russell, a U.S. Navy 
captain, and Max Boot, both at the Council on Foreign Relations, note that Iran tried but 
failed to close the Strait of Hormuz during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, though Iranian 
forces did manage to frequently harass Kuwait oil tankers.
239
  Kahl suggests that the 
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Iranians might nevertheless have a strong motive for trying to blockade the strait – just an 
attempt to close it would send international oil markets into a frenzy, undermining the 
fragile global economic recovery and leading to massive pressure on the United States to 
de-escalate any conflict with Iran.
240
  In reality, Kahl continues, such a move would 
likely have the opposite effect on Washington, prompting it to escalate by taking more 
drastic military steps to ensure the Strait of Hormuz remains open for shipping traffic.   
While there is no doubt that the United States would win in any conflict with Iran 
in a purely military sense, it could easily escalate into a messy war with unintended 
consequences for the United States, Israel and Iran‘s neighbors.  Iran has the ability to 
cause trouble in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and 
elsewhere.  Former IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei described the fallout from any 
attack on Iran to destroy its nuclear facilities in apocalyptic terms:  
A military solution … will give (Iran's) regime the full (domestic) support, 
the full justification to go for a crash course to develop nuclear weapons. 
The know-how is there, you cannot take it out of their minds. … They will 
simply, in my view, go underground. The region is already in an 
unsustainable situation and adding an attack will simply create a ball of 
fire which will ricochet everywhere, in every part of the world.
241
 
 
Like ElBaradei, Kahl predicts that Iran‘s unpopular leadership would benefit from a U.S. 
military attack, as ordinary Iranians would rally behind the ―nuclear hard-liners, 
increasing the odds that Iran would emerge from a strike even more committed to 
building a bomb.‖242  He dismisses Kroenig‘s, Fry‘s and Schmitt‘s suggestions that an 
attack might increase antipathy towards the Iranian leadership.  One reason for this, Kahl 
argues, is the popularity of the country‘s nuclear program among ordinary Iranians: ―To 
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the extent that there is internal dissent over the program, it is a discussion about whether 
the country should acquire nuclear weapons or simply pursue civilian nuclear 
technology.‖243   
While there are Arab leaders who would welcome a U.S. attack on Iran‘s nuclear 
facilities, above all in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Kahl says that the Arab Street 
might not share those leaders‘ enthusiasm.244  There could be an upsurge of anti-
Americanism and a swell of sympathy for Iran across the Middle East.  Populist Islamist 
governments that took power in the wake of the Arab Spring in Egypt and elsewhere 
might be inclined to side with Iran against the United States.  There is are other problems 
with the ―regime change‖ scenario Fly and Schmitt advocate – it is not at all clear that 
toppling the Islamic leadership in Iran would lead to a government that would opt against 
developing a nuclear deterrent.  Iran‘s nuclear program was launched prior to the 1979 
Islamic revolution, when the Shah was still in power.  With or without regime change, it 
is very possible that a new Iranian government would seek to continue the program for 
the strategic and security reasons discussed in previous chapters.   According to a former 
senior IAEA official, Iranian opposition leader Mirhossein Mousavi, a central figure in 
the 2009 green revolution who was Iran‘s prime minister from 1981 to 1989, was among 
the Iranian officials who approved Tehran‘s initial contact with the A.Q. Khan network 
that set Iran‘s secret nuclear program in motion in the 1980s.  This was clear from the 
fact that Mousavi‘s signature was on a monetary transfer to individuals involved in the 
initial purchase of centrifuge technology.
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 This chapter has focused mainly on the possibility of a U.S. attack.  But as 
Netanyahu‘s warnings cited above made clear, an Israeli attack on Iran‘s nuclear facilities 
is also a possibility.  Some analysts say that Israel is less inclined to attack Iran 
unilaterally now that Obama has committed himself to preventing Iran from getting a 
nuclear weapon.  But the possibility of an Israeli attack remains.  As mentioned 
previously, Israel attacked Iraq‘s nuclear facilities in 1981 and Syria‘s in 2007.  Iran‘s 
program, however, is much more advanced than the Iraqi or Syrian programs were, with 
its facilities are spread across the country, some of them deep underground and others 
near population centers like Isfahan.  That fact, combined with Iran‘s air-defense systems 
deployed around key nuclear facilities, makes any military operation aimed at destroying 
Iran‘s nuclear capabilities a difficult and risky venture. 
Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic, an expert on the Middle East, has argued that 
the negative consequences of an Israeli attack outweigh any potential benefits.  Those 
negative consequences are the following: innocent people would die; it might not succeed 
in destroying or crippling Iran‘s nuclear program; even if it does work, Iran can rebuild it; 
an Israeli strike could cause an upsurge of sympathy for Iran among Sunni Arabs who 
despise the Iranian government for supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad‘s brutal 
war against rebels determined to oust him; it could trigger a ―war without end‖ in the 
region; it could damage U.S.-Israeli relations; it could undermine U.S. policy aimed at 
destabilizing Iran‘s leadership and preventing it from getting nuclear weapons through 
diplomatic methods such as sanctions.
246
  Another Israeli commentator, Amos Harel, 
wrote in Haaretz that the likelihood of an Israeli attack has diminished in recent months, 
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partly due to the upcoming Iranian presidential elections in June, in which Ahmadinejad 
will not be permitted to run because of Iran‘s constitutional two-term limit.247  The 
departure of Ahmadinejad from Iran‘s political scene means that Israel‘s principal 
bogeyman will lose his podium.  Another reason for Israel to refrain from an attack, 
Harel argues, is that Washington does not want the Israelis to interfere with, or 
undermine support for, the international sanctions stranglehold that that Washington 
believes is choking the Iranian economy. 
Washington is satisfied that the sanctions have caused considerable 
damage to the Iranian economy and believes that for now, it makes sense 
to continue along this track.
248
 
 
 There is also a non-violent method of attacking Iran‘s nuclear program that the 
United States and its allies have used – sabotage.  The best known act of sabotage 
involved a computer virus called Stuxnet that was designed to attack enrichment 
centrifuges installed at Iran‘s Natanz enrichment plant, the first use of malware to target 
industrial machine operations.
249
  According to a white paper prepared by the U.S. 
internet security firm Symantec, the virus was first spotted ―in the wild‖ in 2007, though 
an earlier version might have been in circulation as early as 2005.
250
  Symantec said the 
Stuxnet worm is ―the first computer software threat that was used as a cyber-weapon.‖251  
The virus, which was reportedly developed by the United States and Israel,
252
 caused 
computer control systems at Natanz that regulated the operation of centrifuges and the 
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flow of uranium hexafluoride gas throughout cascades of centrifuges to fail and hid that 
failure from the plant operators.  The various versions of the virus that hit Natanz 
between 2007 and 2010 targeted crucial industrial control software known as Step 7 (S7-
315) developed by the German firm Siemens AG.
253
  (According to Israeli security 
reporters Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Germany‘s BND foreign intelligence agency 
helped to arrange the cooperation of Siemens.
254
)  The malware affected different parts of 
the enrichment process – it adjusted valves that control the uranium gas flow between 
individual spinning centrifuges in a way that significantly increased the pressure in them, 
or shifted the rotational speed of centrifuges in order to cause severe mechanical 
malfunctions.
255
  According to nuclear security expert David Albright, head of the 
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, Stuxnet was likely 
responsible for the destruction of more than 10 percent of the centrifuges installed at 
Natanz at the time of the attack. 
To date, Stuxnet is known to have had at least one successful attack. It is 
increasingly accepted that, in late 2009 or early 2010, Stuxnet destroyed 
about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges out of about 9,000 deployed at the site. The 
effect of this attack was significant. It rattled the Iranians, who were 
unlikely to know what caused the breakage, delayed the expected 
expansion of the plant, and further consumed a limited supply of 
centrifuges to replace those destroyed.
256
 
 
Iran shut down a number of centrifuge cascades for months and unearthed the existence 
of Stuxnet in its Siemens S7-315 programmable logic controller (PLC).
257
  The existence 
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of the virus in Iran‘s nuclear program eventually became public knowledge and Iran took 
steps to eradicate the Stuxnet and prevent future attacks.
258
  A significant number of 
centrifuges were destroyed, though the sabotage did not affect Iran‘s overall long-term 
production of enriched uranium.  Nevertheless, ISIS said it ―is certain that foreign 
intelligence agencies will continue in their efforts to sabotage Iran‘s centrifuge 
program.‖259  The Obama administration seems to believe covert operations like Stuxnet 
have been effective in slowing down the development of Iran‘s enrichment program. 
In early 2011, for example, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly 
highlighted that the program had been experiencing difficulties. Indeed 
there now appears to be a perception in Washington, and elsewhere that 
the Iranian nuclear issue may not be as pressing as it was two years or so 
ago. This may therefore buy some time for the international community‘s 
dual-track approach to Iran … to work.260 
 
Looked at from a longer-term perspective, it is very possible the success of Stuxnet was 
more psychological than mechanical.  But it proved that Iran‘s nuclear program can be 
targeted with cyber weapons.  And since Iran has to rely on clandestine smuggling 
networks to acquire sensitive industrial technology and software – such as Siemens S7-
315 PLC software – from abroad, it will remain vulnerable to future malware attacks.  
Opportunities will present themselves to saboteurs working for foreign intelligence 
agencies at various points along Iran‘s illicit supply chain. 
 Another method of sabotaging Iran‘s nuclear program has involved the 
assassination of Iranian scientists.  Between 2007 and 2012 at least five senior Iranian 
nuclear scientists were killed – most of them with various types of bombs.  An attempt to 
place a magnetic bomb on the car of scientist Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani failed when 
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Abbasi-Davani jumped out of his car at the last minute.
261
  He was later promoted to the 
post of head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.  Melman and Raviv suggest it is 
clear Israel‘s Mossad was behind the assassinations. 
Three of the four bombings were accomplished by powerful magnets that 
held a uniquely shaped charge – a small but powerful bomb that directed 
all its lethal energy in one direction – when stuck onto a car door. The 
explosives were placed by fast-moving attackers riding on motorcycles, 
and motorcycles were practically a trademark of the Mossad‘s 
assassination unit.
262
 
 
Iran has repeatedly denounced the killings as terrorism and in May 2012 executed a 24-
year-old man for allegedly being a Mossad agent involved in one of the assassinations.
263
  
Last year, Tehran formally complained to the United Nations about the assassinations but 
neither U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon nor the Security Council condemned the 
killings.
264
  Christof Heyns, however, the U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial 
executions, said the killings seemed to reflect a "worrying trend of extrajudicial 
executions of nuclear scientists in Iran. … The killings are unlawful and should be 
condemned.‖265  While the assassinations will likely have little or no impact on the 
further development of Iran‘s nuclear program, they have clearly rattled the Iranians.  
According to Melman and Raviv, Israeli intelligence agencies consider any delay in 
Iran‘s nuclear program, however short, to be a victory. 
The Mossad knew, after all, that the entire Iranian weapons program 
would not be demolished by assassinations of nuclear scientists and 
military officers. Those individuals would be replaced. Yet, any delay at 
all represented an achievement. Israeli strategic thinking – exercised in 
Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere – held that temporary disruptions to an 
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enemy‘s dangerous projects were sufficient cause for taking significant 
risks.
266
 
 
If this is correct, there may be more assassinations in Iran‘s nuclear industry. 
*                  *                     *                  *                  *                    * 
According to conventional wisdom, maintaining a credible military threat in the 
background is an essential part of diplomacy with Iran.  I will discuss that idea in more 
detail in the next and final chapter.  Suffice it to say that there is no sign the threat of 
military action is making Iran any more willing to compromise at the negotiating table, 
though it could be one of the reasons Iran has not yet created an actual nuclear weapon.  
The fear among Iran‘s leaders that the military option could be used most likely had an 
impact on Iran‘s willingness to negotiate in the past.  Iran‘s cessation of weaponization 
work and desire for negotiations with the United States in May 2003 would appear to 
illustrate this point. 
Despite their threats, neither the United States nor Israel appears to be gearing up 
for an attack on Iran anytime soon.  Contingency planning is doubtless at an advanced 
stage, though the Obama administration is pressing ahead with economic warfare and 
covert sabotage operations like the Stuxnet virus.  But if Iran continues to creep towards 
the point where it can develop an atomic weapon at short notice, above all with the use of 
more advanced centrifuges it is developing, the likelihood of a U.S. and/or Israeli attack 
on Iran‘s nuclear facilities will increase dramatically.  The Obama administration has not 
set a clear red line for Iran, an approach that has the advantage of leaving Iran in the dark 
about when the United States might decide to launch airstrikes against Iranian atomic 
facilities.  But Tehran may continue pushing its nuclear program slowly forward until 
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Washington clarifies its red lines – either with an unequivocal public statement or with an 
actual strike against an Iranian target.  The jury is still out on whether bombing raids can 
resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran or make it dramatically worse, though the balance 
of arguments overwhelmingly favors diplomacy over military force. 
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Chapter 7 - Escape From Deadlock: Conclusion and Recommendations 
What can be done to end the decade-long standoff over Iran‘s nuclear program?  
Lessons can be learned from the numerous missed opportunities and mistakes that the 
United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and Iran have made during the 
last 10 years.  It is possible that the window of opportunity has been shut for good, that 
Iran has made up its mind to pursue a nuclear deterrent, whether in the form of a nuclear 
arsenal or a nuclear capability that leaves it in a position where it could build nuclear 
weapons at short notice if it decided to do so.  It is not possible to turn the clock back to 
2003, when a reformist Iranian president was in power and Iran may have been more 
amenable to compromise.  In other words, it is very possible that a deal between Iran and 
the West cannot happen because Iran‘s supreme leader does not want one. 
I believe there is still a chance – albeit a slim one – for a deal with Iran.  Former 
Iranian nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian, a visiting scholar at Princeton University 
who was briefly jailed in Iran before he left the country,
267
 is also among those convinced 
it is not too late.  Iran‘s leaders, Mousavian argues, have long been ready to strike a 
nuclear deal with the United States, the other four permanent Security Council members, 
and Germany, and remains ready to do so today – provided they receive sufficient 
security guarantees from Washington.  
Tehran will not seriously consider having a dialogue with the United 
States on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) questions unless and until 
the United States agrees to discuss Iran‘s security objectives in addition to 
America‘s security objectives.  The obstacles to Washington and Tehran 
opening such a dialogue are serious but not insurmountable as each nation 
becomes more cognizant of the mounting threats to its security.
268
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In order for a deal to take place, Mousavian says the six powers would have to recognize 
that Iran has the right to a full civilian nuclear energy program, including enriched 
uranium fuel production, at least on a limited scale.
269
  Russia and China would not have 
trouble granting Iran the right to enrich uranium, and the Europeans might eventually be 
persuaded to accept the idea. It would be a tall order for the United States and Israel, 
where such a capitulation could be tantamount to political suicide.  Washington has 
already acknowledged Iran‘s right to civilian nuclear energy but is reluctant to permit it 
to enrich uranium, a part of the nuclear fuel cycle the IAEA and the world‘s key nuclear 
powers are generally trying to dissuade countries from engaging in.
270
  U.S. officials 
dislike the idea of allowing Iran to join the club of so-called virtual nuclear weapons 
states like Japan and Germany, both of which could theoretically produce an atomic 
weapon if they ever decided they wanted one.  But according to Mousavian, it is too late 
to turn back the clock on Iran‘s nuclear capabilities.  He has argued that Tehran reached 
―break-out capability‖271 – the moment when it could produce enough weapons-grade 
fissile material for a single weapon – as early as 2002.  That claim is debatable since, as 
discussed in previous chapters, Iran continues to operate elaborate foreign procurement 
operations in an attempt to bypass international sanctions aimed at cutting off its access 
to nuclear and missile technology, raising doubts about the self-sufficiency of Iran‘s 
nuclear program.  But whether or not Mousavian‘s statement is an exaggeration, Iran‘s 
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nuclear capabilities are advanced enough that is not far from being able to produce a 
nuclear weapon if it wanted one.
272
 
 The basic elements of a theoretical deal are clear – Iran would be permitted to 
maintain a civilian nuclear program, including enrichment, but its enrichment work 
would have to be on a limited scale and Tehran would have to permit intrusive, surprise 
IAEA inspections and around-the-clock monitoring 365 days a year.  Russia and China 
would likely accept such a deal, and the European Union might also back it, albeit with 
some reluctance.  But it would be hard to sell in the United States and Israel, since it 
would force them to accept an Iranian nuclear capability and prepare for containment.
273
  
There is clearly a great deal of skepticism in Washington about whether any deal with 
Iran is possible.   Those who dismissed Iran‘s 2003 overture to the Bush administration 
sent via the Swiss saw no point in sitting down at a table with representatives of the 
Islamic Republic.  Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
dismissed the proposal with a simple argument: ―We don‘t speak to evil.‖274   I have 
spoken with officials in the Obama administration who also feel a deal with Iran will 
never happen and the only thing that is keeping them from developing an actual nuclear 
weapon is fear of military strikes.  A deal, if possible, would require compromises on all 
sides – in Tehran, Washington, Europe and Israel, compromises that would undoubtedly 
create political discomfort at home for all governments involved.  But if all sides want an 
agreement such compromises will be necessary.  Iran has not closed the door on a deal.  
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It is therefore necessary to pursue every available avenue to pry that door open, even if 
the chances of reaching a sustainable agreement are small. 
 At the end of this chapter, I will make 10 recommendations for securing a deal 
between Iran and the P5-plus-one.  Before presenting those recommendations, I would 
like to discuss in detail the background of what is needed for an agreement with the 
Islamic Republic and ways that we can learn from a decade of missed opportunities. 
 Striking a Deal 
 1) Does Iran want a deal with the West?  I have attempted to show throughout 
this thesis that a number of Iranian officials have demonstrated varying degrees of 
willingness over the years to strike some kind of deal with the United States and Europe 
that would end the crisis.  Among those are former nuclear negotiator Mousavian, cited 
above, former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani, the outgoing President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his predecessor Mohammad Khatami.  There have been 
others.  Many U.S. and European officials question the sincerity of these and other 
Iranian officials, though the Iranians have also questioned the sincerity of their Western 
interlocutors.  There are clearly numerous Iranian officials – above all Iranian 
conservatives and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – who oppose any 
deal with the United States and Europe, especially one that would limit the development 
of Iran‘s nuclear program and halt its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent.  (Those who have 
become millionaires because of the sanctions – and there are undoubtedly quite of few of 
them in Iran – could also be expected to resist any deal that would lead to lifting of the 
sanctions.)  There is currently no consensus within Iran‘s various power centers on the 
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value of a deal with the West, and as discussed previously, Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei is among those who are highly resistant to any agreement with the West.   
Khamenei has the authority to authorize a deal if he chooses to do so, and some 
analysts believe he may be willing to make one.
275
  Despite his refusal to give way on 
Iran‘s enrichment program, Tehran under Khamenei has insisted that Iran remains 
committed to the NPT and has not ordered the assembly of an atomic weapon.  This 
could, of course, be less a strategic decision and more what Karim Sadjadpour has 
described as Khamenei‘s ―inability to make difficult decisions and his seeming 
preference to muddle along with the status quo.‖276  Ordering the construction of a 
nuclear weapon would represent a radical shift of the status quo from nuclear capability 
into weaponization and would run the risk of a U.S. and/or Israeli attack on Iranian 
nuclear facilities.   With the threat of such an attack looming overhead, the development 
of Iran‘s nuclear program over the last decade has been methodical, not rushed.  Iran has 
worked hard to assemble the various ingredients of a nuclear weapon, focusing on the 
enrichment process, but has yet to put it all together.  It has also refrained from 
developing or acquiring the central component of an atomic bomb – weapons-grade 
fissile uranium or plutonium.   
If the Swiss offer from 2003 was a genuine expression of a desire to negotiate 
with the United States backed by the supreme leader – and to this day that remains 
unclear – then Khamenei did at least once consider the possibility of deal with the West 
to prevent Iraq-style regime change in Iran.  However reluctant he may be about a deal, 
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Khamenei has remained open, in theory at least, to a deal with the West even as he 
pushes the country‘s nuclear program forward. 
Thus far, the supreme leader has opted for a more judicious and 
incremental approach to nuclear empowerment. It is a strategy that has 
served him well as Iran has succeeded in expanding its nuclear 
infrastructure and has transgressed a series of Western red lines. The price 
for such advances has been increasing economic penalties and a degree of 
international isolation.
277
 
 
It remains to be seen whether the worsening economic bite of international sanctions and 
the threat of military action will change Iran‘s nuclear decision-making calculus, though 
the history of Iran, which has lived under sanctions for decades, has shown that it is 
remarkably resilient to trade restrictions.  There are no signs that Khamenei is on the 
verge of a reversal.  But in March 2013, Khamenei issued an interesting statement 
regarding the prospect of bilateral discussions with the United States: ―I am not 
optimistic, but I do not oppose, either.‖278  It might simply be a polite way of saying there 
is no point in negotiating with the Americans.  But Khamenei may also be signaling that 
he will not stand in the way of talks with the United States and has not ruled out the 
remote possibility that a deal could be struck with the Great Satan.  Only Khamenei 
himself and those close to him know what he really meant.  Sadjadpour, who is among 
the pessimists who doubt a deal is possible while Khamenei is alive, summed up his 
assessment of the meager likelihood of Iran reaching an agreement with the West: ―Those 
who want a deal can‘t deliver, and those who can deliver don‘t want a deal.‖279 
2)  Are there incentives that could be offered to Iran to entice it to strike a deal 
with the West?   The most important incentives that could be offered to Iran include the 
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following:  security guarantees and assurances that Iran will not be subjected to regime 
change; the suspension and eventual lifting of sanctions, above all the U.S. and EU 
sanctions that make it difficult for Iran to sell its oil; eventual restoration of full economic 
and political relations between the West and Iran; guarantees that neither the U.S. nor 
Israel will attack Iran; acceptance of Iran‘s right to a full nuclear program including 
limited uranium enrichment; normalization of Iran‘s nuclear dossier at the IAEA and 
eventual removal of the issue from the U.N. Security Council agenda; recognition of Iran 
as an important regional player in the Middle East; and an end to sabotage and 
assassinations linked to Iran‘s nuclear program. 
A nuclear deal that would strengthen, not weaken, the Iranian leadership‘s hold on 
power and protect them from regime change might be tempting for Tehran. 
(T)he Iranian regime is unlikely to consent to any such agreement if it 
believes the agreement will harm the regime‘s legitimacy and political 
standing. Therefore, at least in the mind of the Iranian leaders, a nuclear 
agreement worth signing is an agreement that will help, not hurt, the 
regime‘s hold on political power in Iran.280 
 
But contemplating a nuclear deal with Tehran that would strengthen the Iranian 
leadership‘s hold on power is something that many in the United States would find 
difficult to swallow.  While the Obama administration has indicated that it is not pursuing 
a policy of regime change in Iran,
281
 in stark contrast to the Bush administration‘s open 
calls for the Iranian people to overthrow their leaders and reclaim their freedom,
282
 it 
would be hard for Obama to reach any agreement with Tehran that appeared to bolster 
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the Iranian leadership.  Such a deal could make the Democrats politically vulnerable at 
time when Congress is deeply split along partisan lines on a number of divisive domestic 
issues.  Obama‘s Republican rival in the 2012 presidential election, Mitt Romney, made 
clear that if he won he would want the United States to provide solid support to dissidents 
working to topple the country‘s leadership.283  As long as the Republicans continue to 
support regime change in Iran, it is difficult to imagine the United States supporting any 
kind of compromise with Tehran involving sanctions relief, since Congress would be 
reluctant to suspend U.S. punitive measures against Tehran.  And without sanctions 
relief, no deal with Iran will be possible.  This is one of Obama‘s main domestic 
challenges – finding a way to ensure that the Republicans and skeptical Democrats do not 
stand in the way of a deal with Iran and do not sabotage it.  In a way, the domestic 
political challenges Obama would face in selling a deal to America – above all 
overcoming the notion that Iran is a nation of ―mad mullahs‖ that can never be trusted – 
mirror the challenges confronting those in Iran who might want a deal with America – the 
Great Satan who likewise can never be trusted. 
3)  What could Iran offer that would be acceptable to the West?  A complete 
cessation of Iran‘s nuclear program is unrealistic since it is already so advanced.  
Requiring Iran to fully dismantle – or completely suspend for an extended period – its 
enrichment program is also unrealistic at this point, as Iran has made clear over and over 
again.  But there is room for compromise.  If they want to reach an agreement with Iran, 
the United States and Europe will need to accept the fact that Iran has already achieved a 
certain nuclear-weapons capability that cannot be eradicated or reversed without a full-
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scale military invasion of Iran – and there are no guarantees that even a full-scale 
invasion would work.  But it would be possible to require that Iran limit its enrichment 
output – both in terms of the number of centrifuges Iran operates and the enrichment 
level of the uranium it produces – and permit non-stop intrusive monitoring by the IAEA.  
It would have to ratify and implement the IAEA‘s Additional Protocol and accept 
additional intrusive monitoring for a limited period of time that goes beyond the 
Additional Protocol. 
Iran would also have to respond to all the evidence the IAEA has amassed about 
its research into developing a nuclear weapon.  Tehran‘s denials and accusations that the 
United States fabricated evidence about its nuclear weaponization research are not 
credible.  One way to help jumpstart negotiations and get the United States ready to make 
concessions might be for Iran to admit once and for all that it has been dabbling for 
decades in research aimed at developing nuclear warheads and missiles capable of 
delivering them and pledge to abandon all of that research and related activities.  (But 
such an admission from Iran is highly unlikely.)  Tehran would also have to accept 
limitations on its missile program, possibly agreeing to inspections by an acceptable 
outside party, such as a group of countries that includes friendly nations like Russia and 
China and neutral Western states.  In his incisive essay ―Getting to Yes With Iran,‖ 
Robert Jervis added further logical requirements that any workable agreement would 
have to include.  
In the most likely deal, Iran would agree to stop designing warheads and 
to refrain from enriching uranium above the 20 percent level. It would 
retain only limited stockpiles of uranium enriched to 5–20 percent, accept 
limits on the capacities of its enrichment facilities, allow robust 
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inspections of its nuclear facilities, and agree to refrain from building 
facilities that the United States could not destroy.
284
 
 
In order to restore relations with the United States, Iran would undoubtedly need to take 
further steps separate from its nuclear program.  Jervis suggests that in order to reach a 
broader agreement with the United States, Iran would need to cease all support for 
Hamas, Hezbollah and other groups dedicated to the harassment of Israel.
285
  This would 
be necessary to secure Israel‘s support for any deal Washington made with Iran. 
 At its core, any sustainable deal with Iran would effectively be a bilateral 
agreement between Washington and Tehran.  Although Europe, Russia and China have 
participated in on-again-off-again negotiations with Iran since 2006, their involvement 
has always been a fig leaf for direct U.S.-Iranian bilateral discussions, something the 
United States actively resisted until Obama came into office in 2009.
286
  Britain, France, 
Germany, Russia and China would effectively be witnesses and co-signers of any deal, 
third parties who could help oversee fulfillment of some of the promises that Iran and the 
United States would be required to offer each other to secure a proper agreement.  The 
Iranian leadership and U.S. administration would undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance 
in both their countries and there is no guarantee that it would possible in the divided 
domestic political landscapes of Iran and the United States to ratify any agreement 
between Tehran and the West.  Decades of mistrust, suspicion and broken promises on all 
sides have reduced confidence to meager levels.  The Obama administration would have 
the added obstacle of needing at least the tacit support of Israel, which would require a 
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leap of faith in the Israeli government that might not be possible to attain.  Whatever 
promises Tehran would be willing to make, without some support from Israel it would be 
difficult for the U.S. administration to offer the kind of sweeping incentives and sanctions 
relief Iran would need for a deal – not to mention acceptance of an ongoing Iranian 
nuclear capability. 
 Domestic resistance in Iran to a deal with the West could be fierce.  As the failed 
Tehran Research Reactor deal showed, even a limited, one-time arrangement with the 
West proved to be too difficult for President Ahmadinejad to muster the required 
domestic support.  And convincing Iran‘s suspicious leadership that a nuclear deal with 
the West is not an elaborate trick designed to subjugate and/or colonize the Islamic 
Republic would not be easy, especially in light of what happened to Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi – killed in 2011 by NATO-backed rebels who ousted him – eight 
years after he abandoned his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs in the 
interest of improved relations with the West.  
Washington would need to convince Tehran that negotiations were not 
designed to weaken it and that a settlement would end American efforts at 
regime change. Security assurances would have to be part of any deal, and 
they would be hard to craft. The fact that the United States helped 
overthrow Qaddafi in 2011 despite his earlier agreement to abandon his 
weapons of mass destruction program would surely be on Iranian 
minds.
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Convincing the suspicious Khamenei that a nuclear deal with the West would not 
be setting him up to follow in Gaddafi‘s footsteps would not be easy.   
 Coercive Diplomacy 
 The United States and Europeans, with lackluster support from Russia and China, 
have tried to use more than promises of incentives in their attempts to persuade Iran to 
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comply with the demands that it halt its uranium enrichment.  The P5-plus-one‘s dual-
track strategy combines engagement and the promise of ―carrots‖ with pressure, so far in 
the form of sanctions.  That strategy has been based on the assumption that in order to 
push Iran to negotiate in good faith, there must be threats of punishment – the ―sticks‖ – 
looming in the background.  While the P5-plus-one‘s pressure track has involved only 
sanctions so far, Israel and the United States have added the threat of military action to 
the mix as another stick to coerce Iran into abandoning its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent.  
This is what is known as coercive diplomacy. 
In the words of Alexander L. George: ―Coercive diplomacy seeks to persuade the 
opponent to do something, or to stop doing something, instead of bludgeoning him into 
doing it, or physically preventing him from doing it.‖288   Coercive diplomacy differs 
from the simple use of military force because ―in contrast to the traditional military 
strategy … the coercive strategy focuses on the enemy‘s will rather than upon negating 
his capabilities.‖289  The use of force in coercive diplomacy is vital, though it is 
something that is communicated to an opponent or enemy as an inevitable course of 
action only if that opponent or enemy does not alter its behavior: ―Hence, force is 
subordinated to what is essentially not a military strategy at all but rather a political-
diplomatic strategy for resolving or reconciling a conflict of interests with the 
opponent.‖290  In the case of Iran, the threat of a possible military attack by Israel or the 
United States has been in the background of negotiations from the beginning: if 
negotiations and offers of incentives fail to persuade Iran to back down from its 
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confrontational nuclear policy and pursuit of a nuclear deterrent, it has known for a 
decade that it could face military action along the lines discussed in the previous chapters 
– most likely a surgical bombing campaign intended to destroy or severely damage its 
nuclear facilities.   This has added an element of ―good cop/bad cop‖ to the dynamics 
between Iran and the P5-plus-one: since Russia and China oppose the use of force at all 
costs, they have been the good cops, with the Europeans in the middle and the Americans 
playing the bad cops.   
Ironically, the threats of military action against Iran‘s atomic installations are 
probably making the country‘s insecure leadership even more convinced of the need for a 
nuclear deterrent to counter what they suspect is U.S. and Israeli determination to force 
an end to Iran‘s political system.   
(B)ecause Iran's nuclear program is at least in part driven by the Islamic 
Republic's desire to be able to protect itself against attack, this U.S. threat 
is likely to heighten the perceived danger and so increase Iran's 
determination not to be swayed from its current course.
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While the military threats that have been backing up coercive diplomacy to pressure Iran 
to make a deal with the West may have led Tehran slow the progress of its atomic 
program, such threats may also be undermining attempts to achieve a diplomatic solution 
to the nuclear standoff with Tehran.   
Has coercive diplomacy been effective with Iran?  While it has not led to an end 
of Iran‘s quest for a nuclear deterrent, there are signs that it has worked in the past.  Fears 
among Iranian leaders of a U.S. military attack undoubtedly played a role in inspiring the 
2003 Iranian offer of negotiations with the United States on a grand bargain that would 
have included assurances about Iran‘s nuclear program.  Perhaps because the Bush 
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administration was focusing all of its attention on Iraq – which along with North Korea 
and Iran was a member of what President Bush described as an ―axis of evil‖ of nations 
determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction – it failed to notice that the perfect 
conditions for successful coercive diplomacy on Iran may have been in play in May 
2003.  As a member of the ―axis of evil,‖ Iran appears to have reached the conclusion that 
it might be next on the list of potential regime change targets after the fall of Baghdad in 
April 2003.  Ray Takeyh has argued that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was also crucial for 
Khamenei‘s 2003 decision to suspend Iran‘s weaponization work aimed at developing an 
atomic warhead.
292
  From the point of view of Iran, there was a credible military threat at 
the time and it might have been ready to make concessions as a result.   It is possible that 
negotiations based on the May 2003 ―roadmap‖ would have failed, but the conditions 
appear to have been ripe for an agreement born of coercive diplomacy and, as I argued in 
Chapter 3, an opportunity might have been missed to resolve the Iranian nuclear program 
peacefully. 
But if the conditions were good for coercive diplomacy in May 2003, those 
conditions did not last long.  The U.S. mishandling of Iraq, the bungled occupation and 
the bloody insurgency and sectarian violence unleashed across that country for several 
years following the initial invasion sent a clear message to Iran that the United States was 
not capable of successfully implementing regime change in Iraq‘s bigger and more 
populous neighbor.  Stephen Walt argues that the poor U.S. record on regime change 
over the last decade has undermined the United States‘ ability to use coercive diplomacy 
in Iran. 
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(T)he subsequent debacle in Iraq and the U.S. failure in Afghanistan have 
almost certainly alleviated any fears they might have had back then. Iran's 
leaders know we aren't going to invade the country and they probably 
know that air strikes can't bring down their regime. I'm sure they don't 
want the U.S. to attack, but I doubt their fear is great enough to convince 
them to run up the white flag and comply with all of our present 
demands.
293
 
 
Walt looked at Alexander George‘s eight criteria for effective coercive diplomacy and 
assessed whether they have been met in the case of the United States and Iran.  Those 
criteria are strength of motivation, sense of urgency, adequate domestic political support, 
viable military options, asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States, clarity of 
objective, the opponent‘s fear of unacceptable escalation, and clarity regarding the 
precise terms of settlement.  Walt concluded that the first four have been just barely met 
in the case of the United States and Iran.  The United States has failed with the last four 
criteria.  It is therefore not surprising that after 10 years of coercive diplomacy there are 
no signs that it is working with Iran, especially when there is a lack of ―clarity regarding 
the precise terms of settlement‖ – a fundamental problem given that Western nations say 
they want a negotiated agreement with Iran.   
A combination of painful sanctions and threats of military force have not 
persuaded Iran to change course on its nuclear program.  Jervis agrees with Walt that the 
United States‘ overall record with coercive diplomacy is not particularly good.  While it 
worked with the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2003, when a combination of 
threats and enticements induced him to abandon his chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons programs, it failed in a number of other countries.   Jervis said ―a succession of 
relatively weak adversaries in Panama (1989), Iraq (1990 and 2003), Serbia (1998), and 
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Taliban-ruled Afghanistan (2001), did not respond to American attempts at pressure, 
leading Washington to fall back repeatedly on direct military action.‖294  Nor were those 
the only examples where U.S. attempts at coercive diplomacy were either partial or total 
failures. 
Coercive diplomacy did convince the military junta that ruled Haiti to step 
down in 1994, but only once it was clear that U.S. warplanes were already 
in the air. And today, Iran is hardly alone in its defiance: despite issuing 
many threats and promises, the United States has been unable to persuade 
North Korea to relinquish its nuclear arsenal or even refrain from sharing 
its nuclear expertise with other countries (as it apparently did with 
Syria).
295
 
 
As previously mentioned, Iran has been able to glean lessons from another case of failed 
coercive diplomacy – North Korea, which in 2003 withdrew from the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and in 2006, 2009 and February 2013 carried out a series of atomic 
tests.  One of the lessons to be learned may be that U.S. threats against North Korea were 
not to be taken seriously as Washington preferred to handle the North Korean crisis via 
multilateral negotiations in the so-called six-party talks with both Koreas, China, Russia 
and Japan, as well as bilateral talks with China and behind-the-scenes communications 
with Pyongyang.
296
  And there may be another lesson to be learned from South Asia.  
After successfully testing a nuclear weapon in 1998, Pakistan went from pariah state to 
key U.S. ally practically overnight after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 
States.  Iran has undoubtedly taken notice of that.  
 Recommendations and Conclusion 
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 The combination of threats, international sanctions and on-again-off-again 
negotiations between the P5-plus-one and Iran has failed to persuade the Iranian 
leadership to abandon its quest for a nuclear deterrent.   Jervis argues that ―the obstacles  
to successful negotiations may be so great that the best the United States can achieve is a 
form of containment that would maintain something like the status quo, with Iran 
remaining at some distance from a weapon.‖297  Obama has ruled out containment, 
having stated repeatedly that the United States will never permit Iran to develop a nuclear 
weapon.  While this is not a clear red line like Israel‘s – Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu said that Iran will not be allowed produce enough 20 percent enriched 
uranium as raw material for a future bomb – Obama‘s statements suggest that the United 
States might be willing to tolerate an Iran with a nuclear weapons capability provided it 
does not cross the line into constructing an actual nuclear device. 
 Some analysts argue that containment of Iran is not possible.  Shmuel Bar, a 
former Israeli intelligence official who is now Director of Studies at the Institute of 
Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, says Cold War-style containment in the event Iran 
develops an atomic weapon would not be possible.  Containment assumes that leaders 
with access to nuclear weapons will act rationally, which is something that might not be 
the case in a Middle East where Iran has nuclear arms.  Bar paints an apocalyptic view of 
that scenario, which is worth quoting in full. 
The countries of the region will probably be more predisposed than the 
Cold War protagonists to brandish their nuclear weapons not only 
rhetorically but through nuclear alerts or nuclear tests in order to deter 
their enemies, leading to situations of multilateral nuclear escalation. Once 
one country has taken such measures, the other nuclear countries of the 
region would probably feel forced to adopt defensive measures, and 
multilateral escalation will result. However, such multilateral escalation 
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will not be mitigated by Cold War-type hotlines and means of signaling, 
and none of the parties involved will have escalation dominance. This and 
the absence of a credible second strike capability may well strengthen the 
tendency to opt for a first strike.
298
 
 
Bar‘s main point is that neither a nuclear-armed Iran nor its neighbors could be 
relied upon to act ―rationally‖ in the way the United States and the Soviet Union 
did during the Cold War.  Actors in the Middle East – Bar is obviously not talking 
about Israel, which is known to have a sizable nuclear arsenal, the existence of 
which it neither confirms nor denies – may behave irrationally if they have 
nuclear weapons and feel emboldened to engage in dangerous adventurism and 
provocations, thereby increasing instability in an already highly unstable region. 
 But is containment of Iran really out of the question?  Kenneth Pollack has 
argued persuasively that a nuclear-armed Iran could be contained.  In order to 
keep a nuclear-armed Iran in check, Pollack says, the United States would have to 
set clear ―red lines‖ that Iran could not cross, such as using or threatening the use 
of force against any of its neighbors or transferring nuclear material or weapons to 
another country or non-state actor.
299
  Crossing those red lines would mean that 
Iran would face all the force the United States deemed necessary, including cyber 
warfare and sabotage.   
To deter Iran from more aggressively pursuing unconventional wars 
against the United States and its allies, Washington might want to convey 
to Tehran that asymmetric warfare on its part will be met by 
disproportionate responses, such as supporting insurgent and separatist 
groups inside Iran, undermining Iran‘s currency, and mounting relentless 
cyberattacks against Iran as examples. Of course, the essential element to 
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this deterrent threat is that the United States will need to be able to make 
good on it, and the Iranians need to believe that Washington is ready and 
able to do so.
300
 
 
Containment for Iran would be different from the way the United States kept the Soviet 
Union in check.  Deploying U.S. forces to neighboring countries, Pollack argues, might 
send a strong signal to Iran that Washington is serious about its red lines.  But a large 
presence of conventional forces would probably be unnecessary because Iran‘s ―ability to 
project force beyond its borders is extremely limited.‖301  Iran‘s specialty, says Pollack, is 
different, usually involving harassment and subversion. 
Iran is an anti–status quo power that seeks the overthrow of all of the 
conservative states of the Persian Gulf region, and has attempted to 
engineer such overthrows on a number of occasions. Iranian intentions 
vary toward its other neighbors, but it rarely wishes them well and has 
backed a number of terrorist and insurgent groups against nearly all of 
them.
302
 
 
Rather than stationing large numbers of troops in the Middle East the way the United 
States did in Western Europe during the Cold War, which could cause political 
difficulties for some of the regional governments, Pollack recommends having naval 
forces constantly cruising off Iran‘s shore to emphasize the U.S. readiness to use its 
overwhelming military power against Iran.  As Bar mentioned above, there is also the 
question of a ―hotline,‖ something that the United States and Soviet Union established 
after the Cuban missile crisis to ensure swift communications were possible to avert 
conflict.  Establishing a similar hotline with Iran would be problematic, Pollack argues, 
―given the Iranian regime‘s paranoia when it comes to direct contact with the U.S. 
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government.‖303  Without a hotline, Pollack says, more dialogue, cultural and academic 
exchange and bilateral military discussions could help bridge the communication gap 
between Washington and Tehran to avoid miscommunications and misinterpretations 
during crises.
304
  
Accepting an Iran that is somewhere near the threshold of having actual nuclear 
weapons might create some nervousness in the region, but it could be the only way to 
secure an agreement with Iran.  In order for such a deal to be possible, Iran would have to 
be willing to accept certain limitations on its nuclear program.  It is not at all clear that a 
balance can be struck between Iran‘s minimum requirements for what it keeps in its 
nuclear program and the maximum of what the United States could accept.  Above all, it 
is not clear that Khamenei can be persuaded to accept any deal with the West.  But if 
Khamenei can be brought around to support a deal that allowed Iran to maintain a nuclear 
weapons capability, I offer the following 10 recommendations for the United States, 
Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China for ending the nuclear standoff with Iran. 
Recommendations 
1) The United States and Iran should enter into high-level, bilateral, no-
preconditions discussions aimed at agreeing a set of clear objectives for full, direct 
negotiations intended to end the nuclear standoff and reintegrate Iran into the 
international community.   There is no need to abandon the P5-plus-one process but the 
U.S.-Iran dispute – the heart of the problem – must ultimately be resolved bilaterally.  
Such talks should lay the groundwork for negotiations aimed at resolving the nuclear 
standoff.  There have been high-level talks between Iran and the United States since 
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Obama took office, but an ongoing, high-level communication channel connected to 
Iran‘s supreme leader is needed.  This is something both the United States and Iran are 
reluctant to commit to, but it is necessary.   
2) It is also vital that the United States assures Iran that stability in the 
Middle East, not regime change in Iran, is its ultimate goal.  Understanding and 
addressing Iran‘s need for security is crucial if a way out of the nuclear standoff is to be 
found.  
2) Make clear to Iran that the military option is a last resort but 
emphasize that it is a very real option if there is no deal on its nuclear program.  
Public threats of military action and coercive diplomacy have not pushed Iran to abandon 
its nuclear program but the threat of force combined with sanctions may have scared Iran 
to the point that it has refrained from creating an actual nuclear weapon.   
3) Acknowledge Iran’s right to a full nuclear program, including limited 
enrichment well below weapons grade level and monitored 24/7 by the IAEA.  Iran‘s 
enrichment program should have physical limits placed on it – a maximum number of 
centrifuges and a maximum enrichment percentage of no more than 20 percent.  The P5-
plus-one could sign an agreement with Tehran that once the IAEA is satisfied Iran has 
provided proper guarantees that its nuclear program is entirely civilian in nature, the six 
nations – including the United States – would seek to provide it with civilian nuclear 
technology after a certain period of time. 
4) Offer Iran the possibility of comprehensive sanctions relief and 
normalization of relations with the West if it takes concrete steps to resolve the doubts 
about its nuclear program as verified by the IAEA.  Make clear to Iran that the alternative 
 123 
to sanctions relief is more sanctions on its oil exports and continued isolation.  There 
would have to be a period of at least one year during which Iran would have to prove that 
it was cooperating with the IAEA before any major sanctions relief and steps toward 
normalizing relations with the West could be made.  Also, all the incentives discussed 
earlier in this chapter should be put on the table.
305
 
5) Continue working on Russia and China to help close ranks within the 
P5-plus-one.  It may be impossible to bring Moscow and Beijing along on further U.N. 
sanctions against Iran, but keeping them on board on the Iran issue is crucial.  While the 
core of any agreement between Iran and the P5-plus-one would be a bilateral U.S.-Iranian 
deal, having the support of Russia and China is important to ensure that Iran does not 
have an escape hatch when it comes to the already existing sanctions.  Moscow and 
Beijing can and should do much more to ensure the U.N. sanctions currently in place are 
properly implemented.   
6) Make clear and realistic demands of Iran on its nuclear program – 
Tehran must provide full cooperation with the IAEA, come clean about its nuclear arms 
research and accept the most intrusive monitoring possible for a specific time period, 
including surprise inspections.   The IAEA should be permitted to decide what would be 
required of Iran to prove its nuclear program is peaceful in nature.  Failure to comply 
with this will result in breach of the agreement and the possibility of further sanctions. 
7)  Iran must commit to recalibrating its missile program so that it is 
purely defensive.  It should dismantle long-range offensive missile programs – above all 
the development of nuclear-capable missiles – and agree to an independent missile 
inspection regime, in addition to IAEA inspections, that will satisfy the P5-plus-one. 
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9) Prepare for containment of Iran in the event negotiations fail.  The 
United States must assure Israel and other countries in the region that it will commit itself 
militarily to helping protect the region though concrete containment steps if Iran acquires 
a nuclear weapon.  Such commitments could help prevent a nuclear arms race in the 
Middle East since countries in the region would not necessarily feel the need to develop 
their own nuclear deterrents. 
10) In order for the United States to have even the tacit support of Israel – a 
vital component of a sustainable solution – Iran would have to agree to end all support 
to Hezbollah, Hamas and any other militant group involved in attacks on or 
harassment of Israel.  Iran should also accept the two-state solution for Israel and a 
Palestinian state, something that was included in the 2003 roadmap proposed by Iran.
306
 
Conclusion 
 What happens next?  If steps such as the ones I proposed above are not taken, the 
most likely scenario for the foreseeable future is that the current impasse in the P5-plus-
one talks will continue as Iran presses ahead, slowly but surely, towards nuclear 
empowerment.  Iran may stop short of crossing the threshold into developing actual 
nuclear weaponry due to fears of a U.S. attack on its nuclear installations, leaving Tehran 
in a position where it could quickly develop a nuclear weapon if it wanted one.  If that 
happens, the United States and their European allies will continue to tighten their 
sanctions on Iranian oil exports in the hope that Iran will decide that the economic 
difficulties it is facing are not worth the trouble.  Washington will keep pressuring those 
countries that do business to Iran with punitive measures such as banishment from 
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lucrative U.S. markets, while Russia, China and Iran‘s other key trading partners will 
likely only heed such warnings symbolically.  
If Iran does not rush to develop a nuclear weapon, the United States will likely 
hold off with military action, interpreting it as a sign that coercive diplomacy is effective 
enough to warrant continuing with the approach.  So far, Khamenei has pursued his own 
dual-track strategy of defying calls to freeze Iran‘s uranium enrichment program while 
continuing to participate in P5-plus-one negotiations.  It is impossible to disprove the 
hawks who believe that Iran is only negotiating with the P5-plus-one to buy time and 
ward off military action.  But a more likely explanation for Iran‘s desire to continue 
talking is that Khamenei is keeping all options on the table and is reluctant to move 
decisively in any direction.  Iran will continue to negotiate in case a deal appears that is 
good enough to take, while simultaneously pressing ahead with its nuclear program in 
case it decides that developing a nuclear arsenal really is the best way to go.  This is not a 
bad negotiating strategy, since the further along Iran is with its nuclear program, the 
better the payoff for any eventual deal would be.  But Iran has to avoid going so far with 
its nuclear program that it would risk a U.S. and/or Israeli attack.  And even if Iran does 
not decide to go nuclear now, it will always have that option open for the future.  An 
agreement with Iran that defuses the current crisis is possible, provided two conditions 
are met – (1) the offer on the table is good enough to convince Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei not to veto it and (2) the cost of not taking the offer is so high that refusal 
is not an option because it could jeopardize the survival of the regime.  So far, neither of 
those two conditions has been met.    
 126 
It is very possible that no deal can be struck with Iran while Khamenei is in 
power.  Unfortunately there is no guarantee that his successor, whoever that may be, will 
be any more amenable to a settlement with the West.  Since the military option is not a 
real solution to the problem, the United States and Europe have no alternative but to keep 
up the pressure on Iran to accept a negotiated settlement, while encouraging Russia and 
China not to undermine their efforts.  The prospects for success are not good, but that is 
not an excuse to abandon efforts for a diplomatic solution.  And to prepare for the 
possibility that Iran does develop a nuclear arsenal, the United States and its allies should 
prepare a vigorous containment strategy that would provide increased security for 
countries in the Middle East that feel threatened by Iran. 
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